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THE MASSACHUSETTS HAZARDOUS 
WASTE FACILITY SITING ACT: 
WHAT IMPACT ON MUNICIPAL POWER 
TO EXCLUDE AND REGULATE? 
Denise Provost* 
"There was no need for environmental law when there was 
enough water that you could dump anything into it." Justice 
Potter Stewart (retired), United States Supreme Court. ** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Abandoned industrial chemicals threaten a number of Massachu-
setts municipalities-Dartmouth,1 Freetown,2 Woburn,3 New Bed-
ford, 4 Pittsfield,6 Ashland,6 and LowelF among them. Such chemical 
• B.A., Bennington College; J.D., Boston University School of Law. Member Massachusetts 
Bar; Ass't City Solicitor for the City of Newton, Massachusetts . 
•• R. Reeves, American Journey, New Yorker, April 5, 1982, at 73 (quoting Justice Potter 
Stewart (retired), U.S. Supreme Court). 
1. MAss. DEP'T. OF ENVT'L QUALITY ENGINEERING (DEQE), DIVISION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, 
THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT 12 (September 1981) [hereinafter 
cited as HAZARDOUS WASTE]. 
2. Id. 
3. N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1981, at A16, col. 1. 
4. Dougan, R., Victims of Toxic Waste Dumping: Who Should Bear the Costs? Masscitizen, 
vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 1981) at 6, reports that New Bedford harbor is contaminated with polychlori-
nated biphenyls (PCBs). PCB levels in the blood of several New Bedford residents are among 
the highest amounts ever recorded. Boston Globe, April 21, 1982, at 21, 22. 
5. Dougan, supra note 4, at 6. The Housatonic River at Pittsfield has also been polluted with 
PCBs. 
6. Id. The abandoned Nyanza Dye Works in Ashland are leaching mercury and other chem-
icals into the Sudbury River. 
7. DEQE, News Release No. 82-23, Oct. 15, 1981. 
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wastes, or "hazardous wastes" as they have come to be called,8 are 
an expensive problem. The state has spent nearly 3 million dollars so 
far9 on removing wastes from just one site, that of the bankrupt Sil-
resim Chemical Corporation in Lowell. Contractors have removed 
over 5,000 cubic yards of solid debris and 22,000 barrels of liquid 
waste plus another 270,000 gallons of liquid waste in seven bulk 
tanks from the site.10 According to .the Massachusetts Department 
of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE), Silresim's 5.2 acres 
are still "grossly contaminated," and may still need to be paved over, 
encapsulated, or dug up and hauled away to prevent the further 
spread of toxic elements into ground or surface waters.ll 
8. This is a phrase that seems both to frighten and to confuse the public. Surveys have 
shown that citizens often believe that "hazardous" wastes are comprised of or include radioac-
tive waste. S. Garland, New England Braces FO'r Its First Toxic Waste Landfill Site, Christian 
Science Monitor, Nov. 10, 1981, at 6. Note that, in Massachusetts, the statutory definition of 
"hazardous waste" does not exclude low-level radioactive waste. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 41D, 5 2 (West 1981). Nuclear wastes usually go by the more cryptic, and thus less frighten-
ing term "radwaste." Sometimes, of course, chemical and radioactive wastes are dumped 
together. Nuclear Engineering Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241,243 (7th Cir. 1981). 
The term "hazardous waste" is thought to have been coined by the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), and first used in the reports leading up to the adoption in 
October, 1976, of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (ReRA), 42 U.S.C. 55 
6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), Title II of which is labeled "Hazardous Waste." State envi-
ronmental administrators reportedly tried through various informal and lobbying efforts to 
convince EPA to adopt less alarming nomenclature. EPA apparently responded that to speak 
of "chemical" or "industrial" waste would downplay the seriousness of the problem, and 
declined to change the designation. Interview with Debra Sanderson, Director of Policy & 
Management Analysis, Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, in Boston, 
Massachusetts (March 26, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Sanderson Interview]. 
9. HAzARDous WASTE, s'u:Fa note 1, at 12, reports a $2.7 million total. See Lowell Sun, Oct. 
15, 1981, at 4 (reporting that the state had spent first $2.4 million, then an additional $378,000 
on the above-ground phase of cleaning the site; the next phsAe, testing area ground water, 
would require an initial outlay of $121,000). 
10. DEQE, News Release No. 82-14, August 11, 1981. 
11. Lowell Sun, Dec. 11, 1981, at 6. See also M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF 
AMERICA BY ToXIC CHEMICALS 227-28 (1978). The description of Silresim and its troubles in-
cludes a notorious spill into Lowell's municipal sewerage system. The site itself is adjacent to 
River Meadow Brook which flows into the Concord River, a tributary of the Merrimack River, 
a major source of drinking water. Id. at 227. Ironically, Silresim had been founded by a 
chemical engineer who proposed to establish a "model" facility. Id. at 227. Brown reports that 
following Silresim's adjudication of bankruptcy, its founder, Dr. John Miserlis, described his 
business venture thusly: "I had a dream of responding to a need which exists throughout the 
country. But I'm afraid I was ahead of my time." Id. at 228. 
Silresim had been licensed to store and reprocess hazardous wastes under the state Water 
Pollution Control Act, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21, 55 57, 58 (West 1981). State officials sev-
eral times cited the company for violations of operating standards and narrowed the scope of 
its licenses, which were finally revoked in 1977. M. BROWN, supra this note, at 229. See Draft: 
Silresim, at 2 (1981) (available from Division of Hazardous Waste, DEQE, One Winter Street, 
8th floor, Boston, MA 02108). 
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It is the threat of contaminated water that makes neglecting chem-
ical dump sites an even less attractive alternative than the costly 
process of cleaning them up. Portions of public water supplies in thir-
ty Massachusetts communities have become unfit for use because of 
poisoning from illegal hazardous waste dumps.12 This can be an ill-
afforded problem in a state in which over thirty communities already 
have local water shortages.1s Additionally, contamination of drink-
ing water poses health threats. The Massachusetts Department of 
Public Health is currently studying the suspected connection be-
tween abnormally high leukemia rates in the town of Fairhaven and 
chemicals dumped in the Acushnet River and New Bedford 
Harbor.14 Researchers from the Harvard School of Public Health are 
currently studying the link between the elevated cancer rate in the 
city of Woburn15 and chemical pollution in two of its public wells.16 
These wells lie at the bottom of a watershed that drains through a 
chemical dump which is rated by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency as one of the ten worst hazardous waste sites in 
the nation.17 
The Woburn dump cleanup is slated to receive financial assistance 
from the $1.6 billion federal "Superfund" Trust Fund set aside for 
the emergency disposal of toxic wastes.1S The smaller Silresim site in 
Lowell has received federal attention just recently;19 Massachusetts 
12. HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 1, at 1. See also COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, 
SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON WATER SUPPLY, CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION (September, 
1979); Boston Globe, April 20, 1982, at 24 (reprinting the DEQE map showing the locations of 
these communities). 
13. New England Rivers Center Bulletin, at 2 (Winter 1982). 
14. The chemicals are PCBs. Boston Globe, April 16, 1982, at 15. See also Dougan, supra 
note 4, at 7; Boston Globe, June 24, 1982, at 17, 23; Boston Globe, March 13, 1983, at 1, 16. 
15. Woburn has the highest cancer rate of any Massachusetts community with a population 
of over 20,000. N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1981, at A16, col. 1. 
16. The state closed the wells in 1979 upon discovery of the contamination. Id. 
17. Id. The infamous Love Canal dump, by contrast, has been ranked only 24th. Boston 
Globe, March 11, 1982, at 1. 
18. N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1981, at A16, coL 1. The superfund was created by Congress in 
1980, as part of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, at 94 Stat. 2767, 42 U.S.C. SS 9601-9657 (1980). 
19. Lowell Fair Share has asked U.S. Sen. Paul Tsongas (D. Mass.) to use his influence in 
Washington to have Silresim added to the current superfund priority list of 115 waste sites 
that will receive cleanup funding. Lowell Sun, Feb. 18, 1982, at 5. Tsongas also agreed to ask 
then-federal EPA chief Anne Gorsuch Burford to meet with consumer group Fair Share and 
discuss the Silresim situation, reportedly telling the group, "I'll send the letter, but you know 
she won't come." Id. Tsongas' pessimism over Burford's concern with environmental prob-
lems seems to be well-placed; the EPA head subsequently decided to strip the agency's en-
forcement counsel of all independent powers. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1982, at 23, col. 1. An un-
named official in the enforcement division was quoted as saying that Mrs. Burford "wants to 
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also is trying to recover its cleanup costs by suing the bankrupt cor-
poration that collected and hauled the hazardous wastes stored on 
the site.20 Cleaning up these sites, however, is only a crude and par-
tial remedy for the damage done.lI1 At the Woburn site, for instance, 
the dumping of chemicals began in 1853, and has left sixty acres of 
poisoned earth and water. 22 
Sobered by such spectres, Congress28 and various state legisla-
tures24 have moved toward creating regulations that will prevent 
solve things informally, nonconfrontationally, and [feels] that, normally, you don't need 
lawsuits." Id. The direct consequences of this approach have resulted in a congressional inves-
tigation of the EPA and the eventual resignation of Mrs. Burford. See M. Dowd, Extra, "Ex-
tra" Shredder Update, Time, Feb. 28, 1983, at 17. 
Federal assistance finally has been granted to the Silresim site. Silresim was added to the 
Superfund priority site list in late summer of 1982. DEQE Hazardous Waste Update, Jan. 
1983, at 1. Senators Kennedy (D. Mass.) and Tsongas (D. Mass.) have requested the EPA to 
conduct a health study of the area with a view toward possible evacuation of nearby families. 
Physicians have advised families with young children to leave the area. Boston Globe, March 
13, 1983, at B1. 
20. McMahon v. Silresim Chem. Corp., Suffolk Civil Action No. 38257 (filed November, 
1979). 
21. It is also extremely expensive, estimated to be 20 to 60 times more than the cost of in-
itial correct management. See Proper Waste Disposal is Cheaper, EPA Administrator Says, 9 
ENVT'L REp. (BNA) 2088 (1979). 
22. N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1981, at A16, col. 1. 
23. There have been numerous federal laws geared toward alleviation of environmental pol-
lution. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, originally 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), and after 
amendments in 1982 and 1977, the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. SS 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 
1980), are aimed at preventing discharge of harmful chemicals into surface water. The Clean 
Air Act, originally 69 Stat. 322 (1955), amended in 1966, 1970, and 1977, and currently codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. 55 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), regulates discharge of chemical by-
products into the air. Similarly, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. SS 
651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), addresses the personal health hazards of workers exposed to 
chemicals during industrial processes. 
IDtimately, Congress came to realize that "there are no existing statutes which authorize 
the direct control of industrial chemicals themselves for their health or environmental ef-
fect .... " 4 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 4492 (1976). In 1976, Congress passed two major 
statutes intended to change the focus of the regulation of hazardous chemicals at every stage 
of their use. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. SS 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. 
IV 1980), was designed "to prevent unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment 
associated with the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use or disposal of 
chemical substances [by filling] a number of regulatory gaps which currently exist." 4 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 4491 (1976) (emphasis added). The Resource Recovery and Conserva-
tion Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 55 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), similarly, was adopted to 
eliminate "the last remaining loophole in environmental law , that of unregulated land disposal 
of discarded materials and hazardous wastes." 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 6241 (1976). 
24. At the time of the adoption of RCRA, Congress found that seven states (California, mi-
nois, Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington) had.comprehensive waste 
management laws, but that only California implemented a hazardous waste management pro-
gram under authority of explicit state law. It also found that Florida, Massachusetts, New. 
Jersey, New York, New Mexico, and Texas had developed regulations in advance of, or in 
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this kind of blight. Massachusetts is one of the states that has made 
major changes in its laws relating to the disposal of hazardous 
wastes. In 1979, the state legislature enacted the Massachusetts 
Hazardous Waste Management Act (the Management Act).26 This 
law, which incorporates many of the standards of the federal Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act,26 is not especially controver-
sial. 
Then, in the summer of 1980, the state legislature adopted the 
Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act (the Siting 
Act),27 enacted as an emergency law designed to "immediately en-
courage and expedite the . . . development of hazardous waste 
treatment and disposal facilities which provide adequate safeguards 
to protect the public health, safety, and environment of the Com-
monwealth."28 The 1980 Siting Act placed express limitations on the 
power of municipalities29 to regulate hazardous waste facilities or to 
exclude them through zoning changes. so It also established the dis-
posal and treatment of hazardous waste as acceptable uses of any in-
dustrially zoned land in Massachusetts by declaring them as-of-right 
uses. SI These provisions have caused some municipalities to fear that 
they could become the unwilling hosts of an enterprise which has 
earned an unsavory reputation. S2 
The Management Act gave DEQE responsibility to regulate com-
prehensively the collection, transport, storage, and disposal of dan-
gerous waste materials. ss It also authorized DEQE to study the gen-
eration of hazardous wastes within the stateS4 and to plan for future 
place of, legislation specifically covering hazardous wastes. It noted that "New York has a 
Hazardous Substances Act, which is so general that the State has chosen not to implement it." 
5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6261 (1976). 
25. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21C, 5S 1-12, 14 (West 1981). 
26. 42 U.S.C. 55 6901-6987. See also supra notes 8, 23; infra note 51. 
27. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, SS 1-19 (West 1981). 
28. [d. 5 1. 
29. For purposes of this paper, "municipality" will be considered to be any city, town, 
village or other political subdivision within a state. "Regulation" will refer to any rule, law, or 
statute; and "local regulation" will refer to municipal ordinances and by-laws. 
30. See infra text and notes at notes 102-05. 
31. See infra text and note at note 136. 
32. See Boston Globe, Dec. 16, 1981, at 48; Boston Globe, Sept. 19, 1981, at 1, 24. 
33. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, § 4. Section 3 of the Management Act created a hazard-
ous waste advisory committee within the DEQE to carry out these duties. [d. S 3. 
34. Many human activities create the same sort of refuse as an unintended byproduct. Haz-
ardous wastes are simply those elements of our collective garbage which pose unusual dangers 
because of their special properties. They may be, for example, explosive, corrosive, or poison-
ous. See infra text and note at note 52. Of the approximately 7.5 million total tons of waste 
generated in Massachusetts each year, about 350,000 tons (5% of the total) are hazardous. 
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safe disposal. 85 The Management Act is clearly designed to protect 
the public from careless handling of hazardous wastes.86 Under the 
Management Act any unlicensed disposal (often called midnight 
dumping) is a felony.87 While waste disposal may be licensed, landfill 
disposal is the choice of last resort. It is permitted only when DEQE 
finds that certain chemicals "cannot be recycled, destroyed, or dis-
posed of by some other means."8B DEQE has determined, however, 
from its study of the chemical waste situation in Massachusetts, that 
the state will need at least one "secure landfill" disposal site.89 No 
such facility currently exists-legally-in Massachusetts.4o 
Although the 1980 Siting Act was designed to facilitate the estab-
lishment of secure disposal sites, it remains unclear how such facili-
ties are to fit in with local land use regulations. While producers of 
hazardous wastes have become increasingly eager to find in-state 
HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 1, at 1. Most industrial processes generate some hazardous 
waste. The industries which produce the greatest quantities of hazardous wastes are electro-
plating and metal finishing, smelting and refining industries; manufacturers of special 
machinery, electronics equipment, plastics, inorganic chemicals, textiles, pesticides, rubber, 
pharmaceuticals, batteries, explosives, and paint; leather tanning and finishing; and petroleum 
refining. Id. at 4-7. See also N.Y. Times, March 13, 1983, at sec. 3. 
35. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, S 4. 
36. Ironically, the public probably receives more protection from toxic chemicals that have 
become waste than it receives from the same chemicals while they are stored, transported, and 
used for industrial purposes. Sanderson Interview, supra note 8. 
37. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, S 10. 
38. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21C, S 7. This section also forbids the construction of a land-
fill over any existing or potential drinking water source, and prohibits the operation of any 
facility in such a way as to permit the discharge of hazardous waste into water supplies. By 
contrast, the United States EPA on Feb. 25, 1982, lifted the federal ban on the burying of bar-
rels of liquid hazardous wastes in landfills, calling the rule "unworkable and costly." New York 
Times, March 12, 1982, at A12. Apparently, both environmental and industrial groups pro-
tested, and EPA reinstated the ban on March 12. Blake, Hazardous Wastes, Changing Rules, 
Boston Globe, April 20, 1982, at 1, 24. 
39. HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 1, at 7; see also NAT'L WILDLIFE FED. WASTE PROJECT, 
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 5, 6 (May, 1981) (Available from DEQE) 
[hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT REPORT]; MAss. DEP'T OF ENVT'L MGT., BUREAU OF WASTE 
DISPOSAL, lIAzARoous WASTE MANAGEMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS: STATEWIDE ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT REPORT 5-13 (May, 1981) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT REPORT]. 
40. It is important to remember that not all hazardous waste facilities are the same. A 
"dump" is literally that-wastes are left directly on or buried in bare earth. A more sophisti-
cated version of the dump is a "secure landfill," in which wastes sealed in barrels are buried in 
clay-lined pits which are designed to prevent leakage. Garland, New England Braces for its 
First Tozic Waste Landfill Site, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 10, 1981, at 6. At present, 
none of Massachusetts' nine licensed hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities main-
tains a landfill. The largest off-site facility, Recycling Industries in Braintree, incinerates some 
of the wastes it receives, and consolidates others. It accepts hydrocarbon liquids, acqueous in-
organics, pesticides, cyanide, plating wastes, and all kinds of solids and sludges. Lewis Chem-
ical Corp. in Hyde Park accepts solvents and organic chemicals, while most of the other firms 
only reclaim solvents or recycle or bum waste oil. MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 39, at 5. 
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disposal sites,41 communities have become more reluctant to accom-
modate this need. Some communities have passed their own by-laws 
banning the dumping of toxic wastes.42 Others have succeeded in 
persuading the state legislature to pass bills forever exempting them 
as sites for hazardous waste facilities. 43 Pressure for legally ap-
proved facilities continues to be exerted by industry, state officials, 
citizens, and environmentalists concerned about illegal dumping.44 
Several developers have already initiated proposals to build facili-
ties under the procedures set up by the Siting Act.46 They have not 
41. A large percentage of the hazardous waste produced in Massachusetts must be shipped 
out of state for disposal because local facilities do not have the capacity to meet the needs of 
local industries. Wastes are currently sent to sites in New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Alabama. MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 39, at 5. While expensive for Massachusetts in-
dustry, these options do provide a temporary available solution to the disposal problem. These 
soon could become unavailable, however-the Niagara Falls, N.Y., landfill that became the 
resting place of much of the waste removed from the Silresim site in Lowell has had difficulty 
with its licenses and may be forced to close. Planners expect that a Massachusetts capacity 
shortfall will cause severe difficulties within a few years. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 39, at 
5-13. 
Massachusetts industry could theoretically shut down or revamp its processes to stop pro-
ducing hazardous waste. This is unlikely, however, since manufacturing brings in half of the 
state's income, and employs a third of its workers. Any retooling of industrial processes to ac-
complish environmental goals would have to be done very carefully to avoid massive economic 
displacements. MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 39, at 2. 
42. Sanderson Interview, supra note 8. 
43. In 1978, local industry began to complain to then State Secretary for Environmental Af-
fairs, Evelyn Murphy, about the absence of nearby disposal facilities. The state then hired the 
engineering firm of Camp, Dresser & McKee to conduct a study to select a site for a sludge 
landfill. The firm selected three possibly appropriate sites from eleven which had been under 
consideration. Somehow, this information was leaked to the press. At the time the Department 
of Environmental Management had eminent domain power, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
210, S 17, ch. 16, S 19C (West 1981), and some communities must have feared the imminent 
condemnation of a landfill site. The town of Sturbridge and city of Taunton promptly respond-
ed by filing an exemption bill, MASS. HOUSE No. 6359 (1978) which was passed by the state 
legislature, and signed into law by then-Governor Dukakis on Sept. 19, 1979. Sanderson Inter-
view, supra note 8. The bill is codified at Acts and Resolves of 1979, 1979 MASS. ACTS ch. 574 
(1979). 
44. Boston Globe, Oct. 12, 1981, at 22, 23. See also DEP'T OF ENVT'L MG'T (DEM), Hazar-
dous Waste Needs a Safe Place to Go (July, 1980) (available from DEM). 
45. Public concerns raised by these proposals have been presented consistently. Consider 
the following letters to the editor: 
Key issue on hazardous waste sites 
Hazardous waste treatment and disposal have become a cause celebre to many in 
Massachusetts-and justifiably so. Our public officials and policymakers, in their pro-
nouncements, do not, however, appear to understand why we would not welcome 
such a facility into our communities. 
For me, the central issue of hazardous waste is governance. I would not hesitate to 
support a proposal to locate such a plant in my community if three conditions were 
met: 
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been well received; at least two municipalities faced by possible 
sitings have filed suit against the state over issues raised by the 
Siting Act.46 Some aggrieved state legislators have criticized the 
process of siting under the Act, attacking its fairness and question-
ing its legality. A bill has been filed to place a five-year moratorium 
on the Siting Act, but has not emerged from study in committee. 47 
An alternative bill to amend the Siting Act to accommodate many 
community concerns not only would retain but would strengthen 
those sections of the original Siting Act which preclude the direct 
municipal regulation of hazard waste facility development.48 
In 1981, the town of Warren was selected by the Safety Council as 
a possible site for a hazardous waste facility to be operated by IT 
1. Lowest achievable emission rate (LAER) technology is installed and adequate 
monitoring performed. 
2. Community residents elected by their fellow residents constitute 25 percent 
of the board of directors of the Massachusetts corporation operating the facility, 
and 
3. All records of the corporation and the facility are open to public inspection. 
I believe the people of the Commonwealth will accept the risks of Massachusetts 
hazardous waste generators along with the economic benefits if they can exert local 
control and need not have blind faith in a faceless inaccessible corporation that mayor 
may not be trustworthy. 
The Boston Globe, Apr. 13, 1982, at 18, col. 2. 
Opposed to SRS 
The Globe's Jan. 18 editorial, "Hazardous Waste Hazards," mentioned SRS's fi-
nancial status and the perplexing Massachusetts siting process, but it failed to men-
tion that SRS proposes and is determined to locate on one of our most important 
waterways, namely the Merrimack River. This has been a primary and important 
issue in Haverhill since the beginning of the siting process by the state and SRS. 
SRS is a New Jersey firm and that state will not allow such hazardous waste facili-
ties to be built on a waterway. . . it seems that New Jersey is exercising more sense 
than Massachusetts. 
Is Massachusetts so shortsighted in the hazardous waste siting process that it is 
willing to risk its residents and its natural resources to contamination by toxic and 
disease-causing chemicals? 
The Boston Globe, Feb. 2, 1982, at 16, col. 2. 
46. Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, Worcester Super. 
Ct., No. 82-21740 (1982). Warren charges that the Siting Act violates the state constitution. 
Haverhill is suing the state for allegedly improper actions taken pursuant to the Siting Act. Ci-
ty of Haverhill v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, Middlesex Super. Ct., Civ. 
No. 82-683 (1982). 
47. See Boston Globe, Sept. 19, 1981, at 13; Boston Globe, Oct. 12, 1982, at 1, 22, 23; Boston 
Globe, Dec. 16, 1981, at 48. See MAss. S. 1752, 1979 Mass. Gen. Ct., 1st Sess. (1979) intro-
duced by Sen. Robert Wetmore (D. Worcester). 
48. Sen. Carol Amick (D. Waltham) has introduced MAss. S. 1899 (formerly S. 823) 1982 
Mass. Gen. Ct., 1st Sess. (1982), an act making corrective changes in the hazardous waste 
siting process which is under consideration by the Ways and Means Committee. The changes it 
proposes are described infra notes 127-34, and include disallowing any municipality from pro-
hibiting the siting of a facility. 
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Corporation. Warren challenged the procedures of the Siting Act by 
which the selection was made, asserting that they impermissibly 
delegate legislative powers to private parties and the Safety Council 
in violation of due process clauses in the state and federal constitu-
tions, and that the procedures impermissibly preclude the exercise of 
municipal authority to exclude hazardous waste facilities through 
zoning changes. On January 5, 1983 the Superior Court for the 
County of Worcester granted the Safety Council's motion for sum-
mary judgment, upholding the administrative regulations of the 
Siting Act and the restriction of a municipality's authority to exclude 
hazardous waste facilities. 49 The court concluded that Warren's 
recently adopted by-laws excluding hazardous waste facilities were 
preempted by state law in the Siting Act. On this basis, the court did 
not fully reach the constitutional issues before it. 
While the court's order appears to reach a sensible result, the fun-
damental issues before it remain to be fully explored, and further liti-
gation is expected. This article is directed towards discovering the le-
gality of the Siting Act's limitations on the ability of local communi-
ties to regulate hazardous waste facility development. Section II ex-
amines more closely the nature of hazardous wastes and disposal 
facilities in order to clarify the positions of the municipalities and the 
state on the issues. Section III presents the Siting Act in detail, 
especially those sections which constrain the exercise of municipal 
power over hazardous waste facilities. Ii 
Section IV explores the division of power in government. It begins(' 
by describing the powers that states have, and explains how states 
divide these powers between themselves and their political subdivi-
sions. This section specifically addresses whether the Siting Act vio-
lates the Home Rule Amendment of the Massachusetts constitu-
tion,50 the ultimate source of municipal power in this state. Subse-
quent subsections explore the exercise and limits of municipal 
powers in relation to private entities and vis-a-vis the state. The 
limits placed on municipal power by supervening state action. in the 
form of "override" and "preemption" will be scrutinized closely. A 
subsection on the case history of an analogous environmental prob-
lem-the siting of a liquefied natural gas facility-will examine these 
49. Memorandum of Decision and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Town of 
Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, Worc. Super. Ct., No. 82-21740 (Jan. 
5,1983). 
50. This is one of the allegations made by the Town of Warren in its suit against the state. 
See supra note 46. 
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special state powers in action. The final part of Section IV will then 
apply this theoretical framework to the Siting Act to discover the 
limits that it actually places on the exercise of municipal power. Once 
the limitation on municpal power posed by the Siting Act is charac-
terized, Section V will consider whether in this effort Massachusetts 
has violated the dictates of the federal constitution. 
Section VI presents a different mode of analysis. Rather than in-
vestigating the legality of the Siting Act itself, it proceeds from the 
premise that the Siting Act is either in harmony with the dictates 
and constraints of law, or is unassailable in the courts. The section 
addresses the questions whether, in spite of or in accordance with 
the Siting Act, a municipality could prevent the construction of a 
hazardous waste facility, or otherwise ensure the safety of any facil-
ity that was built. The section presents three areas of legal doctrine 
which provide a municipality with potential land use controls that 
could be brought to bear upon a hazardous waste facility siting prob-
lem. The first of these sources is the Siting Act itself: the powers 
that it gives a municipality directly, and other remedies that are 
available through the administrative process and through court re-
view of the siting process. The next area of possible influence is the 
common law, specifically the tort of public nuisance. The third area is 
federal statutory law, to the extent that it confers substantive rights 
upon municipalities. 
While the conceptual framework of this article aims to be exhaus-
tive, its substantive content has no such pretense. Its individual 
parts are by no means uniformly thorough; many merely suggest 
areas in which further analysis should be done. It will be clear that 
some parts are more fully developed than others; the federal ques-
tions especially are prohibitively vast and complex for the scope of 
this article. It should satisfactorily answer some questions, for other 
inquiries, it is merely a prolegomenon. 
Although this article is framed in a posture of challenge, it is not 
intended to encourage adversary relations between the Common-
wealth and its municipalities over the Siting Act. To characterize 
either side as right or wrong is to oversimplify and distort a problem 
as complex as post-industrial society itself. The real "problem" is not 
the Siting Act, but the inherent nature of hazardous waste. The real 
"enemy" is the accumulation of toxic substances in our soil, food 
chain, air, and water supply. 
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II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
A. What is Hazardous Waste? 
Now, here had been this mudhole, the size of a moon crater, 
240 miles long, 60 miles wide, 20 feet deep, black, repellent, all 
ooze, crisscrossed with gutters containing the poisonous efflu-
ents extruded by a better industry for a better tomorrow. 
[Science fiction description of Lake Erie]* 
The Detroit River, which feeds Lake Erie, carries every day, in 
addition to Detroit's largely untreated sewage, 19,000 gallons of 
oil, 100,000 pounds of iron, 200,000 pounds of various acids, and 
2,000,000 pounds of chemical salts. The fertilizer used on the 
farms of Ohio and Pennsylvania and New York drains into 
streams that pour into the Erie. Paper mills in the Monroe area 
of Michigan pour volumes of pollutant waste into the lake. Steel-
makers pour in mill scale and oil and grease and pickling solution 
and rinse water. The Engineers of the Army dredge the harbors 
and channels of the area and dump the sludge into the middle of 
Lake Erie. 
[Non-fiction description of Lake Erie]** 
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The Massachusetts Siting Act defines hazardous waste in almost 
the same language as does the federal Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA).51 The Siting Act definition is that of a waste 
product 
which because of its quantity, concentration, or ... character-
istics may cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in 
mortality or . . . in serious irreversible, or incapacitating re-
versible, illness; or pose a substantial present or potential hazard 
to human health, safety or welfare or the environment when im-
properly treated, stored, transported, used, or disposed of, or 
otherwise managed. . . .52 
* A. BESTER, THE COMPUTER CONNECTION, 27 (1975). 
** G. MARINE, AMERICA THE RAPED 105 (1969). 
51. Pub. L. 94·580, codified at 42 U.S.C. SS 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also 
supra notes 5, 23 (background information on this statute). RCRA is the basic federal statute 
dealing with the problem of all solid waste, including hazardous waste. It is incorporated by 
reference in several sections of the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Management Act, MAss. 
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21C, S§ 1-12, 14 (West 1981). For instance, the statute directs that DEQE 
"establish a manifest system that conforms with the requirements of RCRA." Id. S 4 (West 
1981). 
52. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41D, S 2. The differences between the federal and state defi-
nitions are these: RCRA defines hazardous waste as "solid waste;" the Siting Act refers only 
to "waste" (though there is no indication that RCRA is intended to exclude liquids or sludges); 
the RCRA definition speaks only of "human health" whereas the Siting Act includes "human 
health, safety, and welfare;" RCRA also omits the term "used" from the list of aspects of im-
proper handling. See 42 U.S.C. S 6903(5) (RCRA definition of hazardous waste). 
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Hazardous wastes, then, are substances which by definition pose 
public health problems. 
All creatures and substances are composed of chemical elements 
and compounds, but different chemicals have very different proper-
ties. Some are very dangerous, or have the potential to be dangerous 
in large concentrations. Whether a chemical is natural or synthetic 
does not determine whether it is harmful. Natural substances as well 
as man-made chemicals can cause sickness or death under certain 
circumstances of exposure. Apologists for the chemical industry are 
quick to remind the public that there are such things as lethal doses 
of such naturally benign substances as water, salt, and aspirin. It is 
true that toxicity is relative, but there are significant differences 
among potentially poisonous substances which should not be ig-
nored. For instance, synthetic insecticides such as aldrin, parathion, 
DDT, and dieldrin are so toxic that spillage of a single pound must be 
reported to the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
under Clean Water Act regulations. 53 By comparison, a reportable 
quantity of vinylidine chloride, chloroform, hydrochloric acid, or 
most arsenic, lead, and nickel compounds, each of which has been 
recognized as dangerous in certain amounts, is in the range of five 
thousand pounds. 54 
Admittedly, many natural substances are quite toxic and pose haz-
ards when mined or used in manufacture. Good examples of these 
would be asbestos and the heavy metals55 such as lead, mercury, 
nickel, chromium, selenium, and arsenic. 56 Asbestos is perhaps the 
most commonly used material which has recently been shown to 
cause disease upon exposure. 51 Some of the man-made chemical~ 
Both definitions exclude discharges subject to permits issued under the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. 5 1312 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and nuclear material as defined by the federal Atomic 
Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 55 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Siting Act exclusion is part 
of its definition of hazardous waste; RCRA puts this exclusionary clause in its separate defini-
tion of solid waste, 42 U.S.C. 5 6903(27). A proposed amendment to the Siting Act would ex-
clude from its coverage low-level radioactive waste as well. MAss. S. 1899, 1982 Mass. Gen. Ct. 
Special Sess., 5 18 (1982). See Section by Section Analysis of MAss. S. 1899 (1982), at 3 (avail-
able from office of Sen. Carol Amick (D. Waltham) the bill's sponsor) ("[l]ow level radioactive 
waste was intended to be excluded from the definition of 21D; however, it was not"). 
53. Allied Chern. Legal Compliance Series, Compliance with the Environmental Laws 31-36 
(June, 1980, available from Allied Chern. Corp., Law Dep't, P.O. Box 2245R, Morristown, N.J. 
07960). 
54.Id. 
55. L. CASARE'IT & J. DoULL, TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 11-13, 454-502, 
565-66 (2d ed. 1975). 
56. Id. at 464-65. 
57. Id. at 216. See also S. EpSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 79-102 (1979). 
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which cause problems as waste are halogenated aromatic hydrocar-
bons such as PCBs, PBBs, and vinyl chloride; and pesticides such as 
kepone, chlordane, heptachlor, and aldrin.58 Others are solvents and 
degreasers such as trichloroethylene and carbon tetrachloride. 69 
Paints, dyes, and resins are some other spent industrial products and 
byproducts60 which pose problems as well. 
Most of these substances share a common characteristic-they 
break down very slowly, if at all. For instance, elements such as mer-
cury, arsenic, and lead do not degrade.61 They do not decompose, but 
rather persist in the environment, where they harm or destroy plant 
and animal life.62 Humans who are exposed to these substances, 
either acutely at high doses or chronically at lower levels, increase 
their risk of suffering from any of a variety of maladies, some of 
which may be fatal. 68 
58. L. CASARETI' & J. DOULL, supra note 55, at 504-09; see also W. NICHOLSON, J. MOORE, 
HEALTH EFFECTS OF HALOGENATED AROMATIC HYDROCARBONS Vol. 320 (1979). 
59. L. CASARETI' & J. DOULL, supra note 55, at 503-26. 
60. A recent federal case contains a nice vignette of what happens when solvents become 
waste: 
Among the chlorinated hydrocarbons which Solvents Recovery receives, processes 
and distributes are tetrachloroethylene, chloroform, trichlorethylene, 1,1,1 trichloro-
ethane, dichloroethane and carbon tetrachloride. All of these chemicals are either 
known or suspected to be carcinogenic. In addition, exposure to some or all of these 
chemicals has caused serious illnesses or disorders in human beings. For example, 
trichloroethylene may cause cell mutations, damage the nervous system and induce 
liver disorders. The nervous, pulmonary and cardiovascular systems, as well as the 
liver and kidneys, may be injured by exposure to 1,1,1 trichloroethane. Similar toxic 
effects have been ascribed to the other organic chemicals listed above. 
The chemical wastes which entered the soil on the Solvents Recovery site have 
"percolated" downward into the underlying groundwater and migrated generally in a 
southeasterly direction. The migration of these toxic organic wastes has reached the 
aquifer-i.e., the subterranean stratum which is saturated with groundwater-in 
which Well No.6 of the Board of Water Commissioners for the Town of Southington 
is located. This well, which is approximately 1,600 feet south-southeast of the 
Solvents Recovery property, is one of six public wells maintained by the Board to pro-
vide drinking water to residents of Southington. 
United States v. Solvents Recovery Service, 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D. Conn. 1980) (foot-
notes omitted). 
Solvents Recovery Service, Inc., is presently proposing to build a solvent recovery plant in 
Haverhill, Massachusetts. Garland, supra note 8, at 6. 
61. "Bodies. . . not capable of being decompounded are considered. . . as elements." Sir 
Humphrey Davy, Agric. Chern. (1813) in OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 893 (4th ed. 1979). 
62. See generally, W. MCKEE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE (1974). 
63. P. RHEINGOLD, N. LANDAU & M. CANAVAN, TOXIC TORTS: TORT ACTIONS FOR CANCER AND 
LUNG DISEASE DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 1,120-36, American Trial Lawyers Ass'n 
(1977). 
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Exposure to toxic chemicals can cause respiratory,64 neurological,65 
kidney,66 or liver damage;67 it can cause blood or skin disease,68 mis-
carriage, sterility, and other reproductive disorders.69 Some ele-
ments of hazardous waste are mutagenic-substances which harm 
exposed persons and their offspring by altering their basic genetic 
structure.70 Chemicals may cause birth defects either through their 
mutagenic potential or by direct ordinary toxic effects on developing 
fetuses. Such chemicals are called teratogens. 71 Other chemicals 
cause cellular damage that results in cancer in exposed individuals or 
their unborn children. These substances are called carcinogens. 72 It 
is certainly possible to treat these chemicals respectfully and careful-
ly so that humans are not exposed to them regularly or in high dos-
ages. Nevertheless, chemical wastes have historically been treated 
as though they were no different from ordinary garbage. As a result, 
many persons have been exposed to dangerously hazardous wastes 
which have been released into the air, water, and food chain. 
B. Why Municipalities Want to Exclude Hazardous 
Waste Facilities 
"Are there those among them who can see the water need of 
your tribe? . . . You must make a water decision, friend." * 
Municipalities want to keep out hazardous waste facilities because 
they have a poor track record. Early waste disposal facilities 
employed no sophisticated engineering techniques to achieve con-
tainment; boxes and barrels of waste were often dumped into 
trenches or stacked in empty lots. 78 Over time, the containers 
decayed, releasing high concentrations and peculiarly toxic combina-
64. [d. at 140-60. Asbestos is a major contributor to lung diseases, including cancers. See 
also G. PETERS, B. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASE (1980). 
65. Lead is a widespread offender. L. CASARETT & J. DoULL, supra note 55, at 477-82. 
66. The kidneys are a prime target of many of the metals. [d. at 459. 
67. [d. at 170-89. Most toxins damage the liver, since one of the functions of that organ is to 
filter poisons from the body. Major hepatotoxins include the solvents carbon tetrachloride, 
chloroform, trichloroethylene and tetrachlorethane. [d. at 172. 
68. See W. NICHOLSON & J. MOORE, supra note 58. 
69. [d. See also S. EpSTEIN, supra note 57, at 114, 242-81 (naming plastic vinyl chloride as 
dangerous in this regard, as are most of the pesticides). 
70. L. CASARETT & J. DoULL, supra note 55, at 314. 
71. [d. at 315. 
72. S. EpSTEIN, supra note 57, at XV, XVI. 
• F. HERBERT, DUNE 28 (1966). 
73. M. BROWN, supra note 11, at 255,226. 
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tions of chemicals into the air, earth, and water surrounding the dis-
posal sites.74 One of the better-known of such incidents occurred in 
the town of Niagara Falls, New York.75 That state evacuated 
families from several blocks of residential neighborhoods due to con-
tamination by toxins escaping from 20,000 tons of chemical garbage 
which the Hooker Chemical Company had dumped into Love 
Canal. 76 
Some waste sites have erupted into explosive flames. In 1977, a 
chemical waste treatment facility in Bridgeport, New Jersey, 
burned, killing six; dozens of firemen were treated for inhalation of 
toxic fumes. 77 Similar explosions and fires destroyed hazardous 
waste facilities in Elizabeth and in Perth Amboy, New Jersey, in 
1980.78 In some cases, when winds directed fumes from such fires 
toward populated areas, temporary evacuations of major population 
centers were necessary. 79 
The most common and insidious problem associated with hazard-
ous wastes, however, is that of water pollution. One leaking landfill 
site, for example, has destroyed the water supply of Farmington, 
New Jersey.80 The underground chemical plume from this site, 
which contains thousands of times the "safe" levels of dichloro-
ethane and benzene as well as arsenic, vinyl chloride, lead, mercury, 
cadmium, and chloroform, also threatens the water supply of Atlan-
tic City.81 The United States Environmental Protection Agency 
74. Id. at 227. 
75. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chern. & Plastics Corp., No. 79-990 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); 
Mervak v. City of Niagara Falls, 420 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. 1979). See also M. BROWN, supra 
note 11, at 3-59 (detailed history of Love Canal). 
76. M. BROWN, supra note 11, at 5, 28-40. 
77. Id. at 155-56. 
78. Halbert, Toxic Chemical Wastes, Medicolegal News, vol. 8, no. 4, at 15 (Sept. 1980). 
Garland, supra note 8, reports that negotiations over the construction of a solvents recycling 
facility between the city of Haverhill, Mass., and SRS, Inc., ended when the SRS plant in 
Linden, New Jersey, went up in flames on Oct. 1, 1981. Id. at 6. 
79. Halbert, supra note 78, at 15. 
80. Janson, Atlantic City Rushing to M0'IJ6 Wells, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1981, at Bl, B2. 
"Perhaps the most pernicious effect is the contamination of ground water by leachate from 
land disposal of [hazardous] waste." H. REP. No. 1461 Pt. II, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
[1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6238. See id. at 6255-6261 (reporting 53 incidents in 20 
states in which hazardous waste escaped containment, 51 of which resulted in contamination 
of ground water and/or surface waters). 
Ground water collects in formations called aquifers, layers of rock, sand, or gravel holding 
quantities of subsurface water. Unlike rivers and streams, ground water flows extremely 
slowly-from a few feet per day to a few feet per decade. It may move vertically as well as 
horizontally. Ground water is a major source of drinking water in Massachusetts. lIAzARoous 
WASTE, supra note 1, at 8. 
81. Janson, supra note 80, at B2. 
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(EPA) is suing for a cleanup of the dump site and of the poisoned 
aquifer as well as for replacement water supply systems for those 
rendered unusable. Estimated costs may approach $20 million.82 
Chemicals leaching from hazardous waste sites have contaminated 
aquifers allover the country: New Castle, Delaware;88 Islip, Long 
Island;8' Charles City, Iowa;86 several Minnesota cities, including 
Minneapolis;86 Aurora, Illinois; 87 Houston, Texas; 88 Hardeman 
County, Tennessee;89 Clarkson, Washington;90 and Southington, 
Connecticut91 are among those communities where such pollution 
has occurred, often forcing the capping of wells. Underground water 
contamination is especially problematic, since once trapped in aqui-
fers, chemicals are unlikely to evaporate or degrade.92 This is a mat-
ter of some concern in the United States, where 80 percent of munic-
ipal water systems serving 30 percent of the nation's population de-
pend on ground water. 98 Chemical dump sites also leak toxins into 
rain runoff and from there into drainage ditches, lakes, creeks, 
streams, and rivers, either through careless engineering practices or 
by accident. 9' 
For most of its history, chemical waste disposal has not been sub-
ject to good engineering practices. Many handlers of waste chem-
icals were probably unaware of their hazardous qualities; others sim-
ply did not care. Some who contracted to dispose of waste chemicals 
found that it was easy and profitable to dump them illicitly on other 
people's property, or to stockpile the chemicals in barrels on leased 
land, then abandon the site.96 Such unscrupulous practices have led 
some observers to warn that hazardous waste disposal businesses 
may be in the hands of organized crime.96 
Awareness of these problems and their potential economic conse-
quences97 has led to tighter controls over the manufacture, use, and 
82. [d. 
83. M. BROWN, supra note 11, at 100. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. at 103-08. 
86. [d. at 108. 
87. [d. at 111. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 123-25. 
90. [d. at 127. 
91. United States v. Solvents Recovery Service, 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980). 
92. M. BROWN, supra note 11, at 100. 
93. [d. at 101. 
94. [d. at 231-40, 289-310. 
95. [d. at 243-53, 260-65. See also supra text and notes at notes 6-14. 
96. M. BROWN, supra note 11, at 240-41, 253-60. 
97. Dougan, supra note 4, at 6, reports that "Love Canal has cost New York State tax-
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disposal of hazardous chemicals. Congress has promulgated its own 
regulatory statutes, most notably the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, under the au-
thority of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.98 Congress has 
declared that "with respect to the environment and health, . . . haz-
ardous waste presents, in addition to the problems associated with 
non-hazardous solid waste, special dangers to health and requires a 
greater degree of regulation than does non-hazardous solid 
waste .... "99 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is the fed-
eral statute which most pervasively regulates the disposal of toxic 
chemicals.1oo It sets up a framework in which the federal govern-
ment has the responsibility to set minimum standards for the mainte-
nance of hazardous waste facilities and the states have the responsi-
bility, at very least, to require and supervise conformity with these 
minimum standards. RCRA provides that 
[N]o state or political subdivision may impose any require-
ments less stringent than those authorized under [RCRA] 
respecting the same matter . . . [but] nothing in this title shall 
be construed to prohibit any state or political subdivision thereof 
from imposing any requirements, including those for site selec-
tion, which are more stringent than those imposed by [RCRA].lOl 
This provision appears to leave the states with clear federal 
authorization to run their own waste management and facility siting 
programs. It seems as well to allow some room for political subdivi-
sions of the States-municipalities or even counties-to adopt more 
stringent requirements regarding hazardous waste disposal. RCRA, 
however, does not itself divide this authority between states and 
municipalities. As a consequence, there are many relatively new 
complicated laws concerning hazardous waste disposal, among them 
the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act. The Siting 
Act sets out elaborate procedures for determining how a municipali-
ty will be chosen as the site of any new hazardous waste facilities. 
payers $265 million already; federal taxpayers another $500 million." 
98. These include the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 5S 
6901·6987 (1976 & supp. IV 1980), and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 5S 
2601-2629 (1976 & supp. IV 1980). 
99. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. S 6901(b)(5). 
100. TSCA also regulates disposal of toxic chemicals, but in much less detail. See supra note 
23. In practical effect as well as structure, TSCA is geared more toward the regulation of haz-
ardous chemicals as products, with emphasis on the pre-marketing stage. See 15 U.S.C. S 2609. 
101. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. S 6929 (emphasis added). 
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The problem is that no municipality seems to want any such facility 
located within its borders. In fact, the municipalities want the state 
or the EPA to dig up their old, abandoned waste dumps and haul 
them away. The resulting conflict has done little to alleviate the 
problems posed by hazardous wastes. 
III. THE MASSACHUSE'ITS HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING ACT 
The Massachusetts Siting Act is a comprehensive statute which 
provides for state assistance with and supervision of the construc-
tion and operation of new hazardous waste facilities (HWFs). The 
statute gives the state Department of Environmental Management 
(DEM) primary responsibility for the siting process.102 The Siting 
Act directs DEM to study the risks and impacts of various hazardous 
waste sources and management technologies; to solicit and evaluate 
construction proposals; and to disseminate information regarding 
these matters to the public. lOS 
The Siting Act creates a state Hazardous Waste Facility Safety 
Council (Safety Council)104 to oversee the operation of the hazardous 
waste facility siting process. The Safety Council is empowered to ad-
vise participants in the siting process; to award technical assistance 
grants to cities and towns; to review all proposals for construction 
and operation of hazardous waste facilities, and to reject proposals 
which it finds to be unacceptable. lOS The twenty-one member Safety 
Council106 also has responsibility for facilitating negotiations be-
102. The reader will recollect that primary responsibilities under the state Hazardous 
Waste Management Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, SS 3, 4 (West 1981), including licens-
ing, are vested in the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, DEQE, not in DEM. 
Section 4 of the Siting Acts provides that both departments "shall cooperate . . . and ex-
change information where possible to avoid duplication of activities." Id. S 4. 
103. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, S 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981). 
104. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, S 4 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981). 
105. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, S 4 cl. 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981) allows the Council to re-
ject unacceptable proposals after appropriate consultation with the DEQE. This is one of the 
sections that would be affected by the amendments to the Siting Act introduced into the leg-
islature by Sen. Carol Amick (D. Waltham). See supra text and note at note 49. The proposed 
changes would give the council the authority to approve, reject, or reconsider whether the pro-
posals warrant additional review to continue in the siting process either after consultation 
with the DEQE or after the receipt of information from the DEM, local, state, or federal agen-
cies, or other sources. MAss. S. 1899, 1982 Mass. Gen. Ct. Special Sess., S 2 (1982). All other 
references to the proposed changes in the notes to this section of the article will refer to the 
changes suggested by these proposed amendments. 
106. The Council consists of the Secretaries of Environmental Affairs, Public Safety, 
Economic Affairs, Communities and Development, or their designees; the Commissioners of 
Environmental Quality Engineering, Environmental Management, Public Health, or their 
designees; the chairman of the Public Utilities Commission or his designee; one representative 
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tween a facility developer and the host community, and determining 
whether at any point the parties have come to a negotiations im-
passe.107 The Safety Council may, if it chooses, appoint two residents 
of the host community to participate in and vote on matters related 
to the site selection in the community. lOS 
Developers who propose to construct HWFs must submit notices 
of intentlo9 to the Safety Council, the Department of Environmental 
Management, the Department of Environmental Quality Engineer-
ing, and to the chief executive officers of the proposed host commun-
ities.110 The Safety Council then reviews the proposed projects to 
determine whether they are "feasible and deserving of state assist-
ance." 111 The Department of Environmental Management must con-
duct briefing sessions to ensure the participation of interested per-
sons.112 If the developer has indicated a willingness to accept 
alternative site suggestions, DEM will accept such suggestions for a 
fifty-day period after the briefing sessions.113 If suggestions are sub-
mitted, the Council draws up a final list and notifies the chief execu-
tive officers of the proposed host communities and all abutting com-
each of the Massachusetts Municipal Association, the Massachusetts Health Officers Associa-
tion, the local boards of health, the Associated Industries of Massachusetts; a professional 
hydrogeologist; a professional chemical engineer; a representative of the public knowledgeable 
in environmental affairs; and six representatives of the public. The proposed changes would 
replace two of the six representatives of the public with representatives o( two different 
organizations whose major activities are environmental protection. MASS. S. 1899, 1982 Mass. 
Gen. Ct. Special Sess., § 3 (1982). 
107. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 4 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981). 
108. [d. The proposed changes would make appointment of two host community residents 
mandatory. MASS. S. 1899, supra note 52, § 4 (1982). 
109. A notice of intent must include a description of the proposed facility, what hazardous 
wastes the developer proposes to treat, a description of the site and the present suitability of 
the site, including what additional measures, if any, will be required to make the site suitable. 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 7. The proposed changes require that the notice of intent contain 
a site analysis made by qualified professionals with respect to impact on wetlands, surface 
water bodies and their floodplains, and drinking water supplies. MASS. S. 1899, supra note 52, 
S 10 (1982). 
110. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1981). 
111. [d. The proposed changes would establish specific criteria upon which the Council must 
base its decision. These criteria include a determination of a regional need for the facility pro-
.p()sed; the soundness of the proposed technology; and the developer's financial capability and 
management history. The changes also provide that no facility can be located within a 100-year 
floodplain, wetlands, areas of critical environmental concern, a barrier beach, or within an 
area of an existing conservation restriction. MAss. S. 1899, supra note 52, S 11. 
112. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, S 8. The proposed changes would provide that briefing ses-
sions be held before the Council's decision on whether the project warrants additional review. 
MASS. S. 1899, supra note 52, § 12 (1982). 
113. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, S 9 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1981). 
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munities.u4 The developer is required to prepare a preliminary pro-
ject impact report which includes both an environmental impact 
report and a social economic appendix, and must submit the report to 
the Council and the Secretary of the Executive Office of Environ-
mental Mfairs, U6 who must both approve the proposal. 
Within thirty days after a developer notifies a community of inten-
tion to construct a HWF, that community must establish a local 
assessment committee composed of officials and residents of the 
host community as well as representatives of abutting communi-
ties.u6 The local assessment committee must then negotiate with the 
developer the detailed terms of a siting agreement. U7 The commit-
tee becomes entitled to receive and expend technical assistance 
grants during this process.U8 The assessment committee ultimately 
has the power and duty to enter into a binding contract with the de-
veloper,u9 a contract which represents the "best interests" of the 
host community.120 These interests are expressed as protection of 
public health and safety, and of the environment and fiscal welfare of 
the host community .121 This contract, represented by the siting 
agreement,122 must receive further analysis and approval before the 
parties can act upon it. The developer must use the contract as the 
basis for a final project impact report which the developer submits to 
the state.12S The Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental 
Affairs and the Safety Council evaluate this report.124 Only after 
114. [d. 
115. [d. § 10. 
116. [d. § 5. 
117. [d. S 5(2). 
118. [d. S 5(3) (referring to grants made available pursuant to § 11 of the same chapter). 
119. [d. S 5 lists the powers and duties of local assessment committees without indicating 
whether all the listed items are in fact duties-activities which are mandatory-or whether 
some are simply powers which may be exercised at will. The proposed changes do not address 
this problem of unartful drafting. Subsection (4) of the list, id. § 5(4), says that the contract 
with the developer is entered into by the decision to sign a siting agreement. The contract and 
siting agreement thus will be considered, for purposes of this statute, synonymous. 
120. [d. S 5(1). 
121. [d. S 5(2). 
122. The siting agreement is a nonassignable contract binding on both parties. Its terms and 
conditions include, but are not limited to: facility construction, maintenance, and operating 
procedures; the design of the facility; practices and standards necessary to demonstrate the 
safety of the facility; services provided by the host community; compensation and special bene-
fits provided by the developer; provisions for tax prepayments; provisions for renegotiating 
terms and for resolving disputes. The agreement may also include provisions to assure public 
health and safety; provisions to assure the continuing economic viability of the project; and 
provisions to assure the protection of the environment. See id. § 12. 
123. [d. S 10. 
124. [d. 
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both have found it to be in compliance with all applicable provisions 
of law may the Safety Council declare that the siting agreement is 
operative.126 Under the Siting Act, no construction can begin until 
these procedural steps have been followed. 126 
The Siting Act does not contemplate that negotiations between de-
veloper and host community will necessarily run smoothly and pro-
gress to a siting agreement in all cases. The statute provides that, if 
within sixty days after the Safety Council's initial approval of the 
project,127 either the developer or the local assessment committee of 
the host community informs the Safety Council of a negotiations im-
passe, the Council may proceed to frame the issues in dispute for 
submission to final and binding arbitration. 128 The arbitration panel 
has forty-five days129 to resolve the issues in dispute, and, presum-
ably, forge a siting agreement from 'its resolutions.13o 
The binding arbitration provision adds a new twist to the siting 
process as described so far. Up to this point, the Siting Act has had 
the character of a piece of enabling legislation.131 It has created 
125. [d. A siting agreement becomes effective when signed by the chief executive officer of 
the host community, who has been so directed by a majority vote of the local assessment com-
mittee, and by a representative of the developer. [d. § 13. 
126. [d. § 12. 
127. The Siting Act does not call for a specific time after Safety Council approval of a proj-
ect proposal during which the developer and the local assessment committee must begin to 
negotiate, as called for in § 5. The only indication of the timeframe which is contemplated ex-
ists in § 15 which provides for a 60-day period after the Safety Council's approval before deter-
mining whether a negotiations impasse exists. See id. § 15. 
Under the proposed changes, the phase of the negotiations period would be extended to 180 
days. MASS. S. 1899, supra note 52, § 14 (1982). Under the existing section 15, MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 21D, § 15, the Safety Council has the sole discretion to extend this 60-day period, 
even if both developer and community would like to postpone the declaration of impasse. 
128. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 15 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982). The arbitration panel 
which the Safety Council is directed to establish under this section is to consist of three per-
sons; one each chosen by the developer and community, and a third impartial arbitrator 
selected by or acceptable to both. [d. 
129. This time period may be extended at the request of any member of the arbitration 
panel. [d. § 15 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982). 
130. Section 15 provides that the arbitration proceedings be terminated should "the parties 
mutually resolve each of the issues in dispute." [d. § 15. However, parties locked in intractable 
dispute will probably find themselves held to the panel's decisions, which the statute does 
describe as "final and binding." [d. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has upheld a 
similar mandatory arbitration provision applicable to towns locked in a bargaining impasse 
over wages and employment conditions with their police forces and firefighters. See Arlington 
v. Bd. of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 774, 352 N.E.2d 914, 918 (1976),laterpro-
ceedings, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 874, 375 N.E.2d 343 (1978). This case tends to support the state 
constitutionality of the mandatory arbitration provisions of the Siting Act. 
131. For an explanation of what enabling legislation is and what it does, see infra text and 
note at note 166. 
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specific, substantive powers in the municipalities that become pro~ 
spective host communities, and further described the procedures by 
which those powers are brought into play. Binding arbitration, how-
ever, places a substantive limit on municipal power .132 It takes from 
the community the power to opt out of the siting process by refusing 
to bargain with the developer. 
Under the Siting Act, municipalities confronted by HWF propos-
als must be prepared to protect their interests through negotiations 
and arbitration133 and through the provision that the developer pay 
compensation to the host community for demonstrable adverse im-
pacts imposed by the siting of the facility.134 Communities which 
132. An interesting contrast to this imposition on local autonomy is presented by section 17 
of the Siting Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 17, which establishes the eminent domain 
authority of DEM with respect to hazardous waste facility sites. Eminent domain refers to the 
power of governments to "take" private land for public purposes, such as the building of 
highways, when necessary. Owners of such property are entitled to receive its fair market 
value in compensation for its being so taken. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. If a developer has dif· 
ficulty purchasing land for the construction of a HWF, he may petition the Department of En-
vironmental Management to exercise its eminent domain power. Under the Siting Act, 
however, DEM can take the parcel by eminent domain only if a majority of the governing body 
of the municipality votes to approve this action. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 17 
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981). 
A case from another jurisdiction demonstrates how tempting it can be to invoke the eminent 
domain power in order to gain advantage in a dispute over hazardous waste facility siting. A 
county in Georgia attempted to obstruct the development of that state's first hazardous waste 
disposal facility, a landfill, by condemning the property intended to be sold to the developers 
for the purported purpose of creating a public park. The Georgia Supreme Court invalidated 
this maneuver, finding that the parcel of land had been taken in bad faith for the sole purpose 
of preventing the construction of the hazardous waste landfill. Earth Management v. Heard 
County, 16 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1720, No. 37303, Georgia Supreme Court, 198!. 
133. Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Management Act, MAss. ANN . LAWS ch. 21 C, 1-12, 14 
(Michie/Law Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1982), admittedly provides additional significant safeguards, 
especially in S 7, Licensing Requirements and Siting of Facilities. [d. § 7. 
134. This is one of the optional conditions that may be included in a siting agreement. MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 2lD, § 12(BXl) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1981). The chief executive officer of any 
abutting community may also petition the Safety Council for the payment of compensation by 
the developer to the abutting community for any "demonstrable harm." [d. § 14. Neither of 
these sections, however, either defines "demonstrable adverse impacts" or suggests what 
harms are contemplated to be compensable. It is likely that decreases in real estate value are 
the impacts referred to. See Garland, supra note 8. It is theoretically possible that a communi-
ty might want to trade a present, lump-sum payment from the developer in exchange for ac-
cepting an adverse impact from the waste facility which the community would not otherwise 
be expected to-or inclined to- countenance. One possible example of this could be a continual 
shower of ashes from an incinerator facility. 
Such an exchange would be rather unusual. Ordinarily, the remedy that a town has against 
an ongoing nuisance such as this would be an injunction against the perpetrator. Under section 
12, however, the local assessment community could effectively bargain away this right of the 
townspeople for the payment of what amounts to advance damages. See id. S 12. A trade such 
as this was created as a judicial remedy in the well-known case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 
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have existing zoning by-laws and other local land use ordinances con-
cerning hazardous wastes may have greater protection from un-
wanted development proposals. The Siting Act itself, however, pur-
ports to preclude municipal regulatory actions which are deemed to 
be designed to obstruct the construction of a HWF under the Act. 
Section 16 of the Act dictates that "[n]o license or permit granted by 
a city or town shall be required for a hazardous waste facility which 
was not required on or before the effective date of this chapter by 
said city or town. . . ." 136 An amendment to the Massachusetts 
Zoning statute, adopted as part of the Siting Act, creates a similar 
restriction. It provides that: 
A hazardous waste facility as defined in the Siting Act shall be 
permitted to be constructed as of right for any locus presently 
zoned for industrial use . . . provided that all permits and 
licenses required by law have been issued to the developer and a 
siting agreement has been established . . ., provided, however, 
that following the submission of a notice of intent by a developer 
proposing to construct a HWF, a city or town may not adopt any 
zoning change which would exclude the facility from the locus 
specified in said notice of intent. This. . . shall not prevent any 
city or town from adopting a zoning change relative to the pro-
posed locus . . . following the final disapproval and exhaustion 
of appeals for permits and licenses required by law and the 
Siting Act.1S6 
Obviously, these provisions, if legitimate, create significant limita-
tions on the substantive regulatory powers of municipalities. In 
Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). There, a factory was 
acknowledged to be causing severe air pollution, but the court was disinclined to order an in-
junction which would effectively have closed the factory, because of the economic conse-
quences. The townspeople objected to this solution, as did Judge Jasen in his dissent, stating: 
I see grave dangers in overruling our long-established rule of granting an injunction 
where a nuisance results in substantial continuing damage. Permitting the injunction 
to become inoperative upon the payment of permanent damages is, in effect, licensing 
a continuing wrong. It is the same as saying to the cement company, you may con-
tinue to do harm to your neighbors so long as you pay a fee for it. Furthermore, once 
such permanent damages are assessed and paid, the incentive to alleviate the wrong 
would be eliminated, thereby continuing. . . pollution of an area without abatement. 
25 N.Y. at 230,257 N.E.2d at 876,309 N.Y.S.2d at 320-21. See also infra text and notes at 
notes 301-52 (the subject of nuisances and remedies for them). 
135. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, S 16 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1981). The proposed changes 
would strengthen and tighten this provision by declaring that, in addition, "[aJ city or town 
may not adopt a by-law or ordinance prohibiting the siting of a hazardous waste facility." 
MASS. S. 1899, § 16 (1982). 
136. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, S 9, as amended and approved with emergency preamble 
July 15, 1980, 1980 Mass. Acts ch. 508, S 5. The provision of this section which freezes zoning 
changes once a notice of intent has been issued was not in the original Siting Act but was add-
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order to discover whether the state may impose such restrictions on 
municipalities, however, it must be determined generally what 
powers governments have, and how these powers are distributed. 
IV. DIVISION OF POLICE POWER BETWEEN STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES 
Municipalities are not sovereigns .... 
A. Division of Power in Government 
The Constitution of the United States describes a government of 
dual sovereignty. The federal government has paramount power 
over international relations such as the power to make treatiesI87 
and declare war;188 certain enumerated national affairs such as coin-
ing money,189 taxation,140 creation of armies;14I and interstate rela-
tions-notably, everything that conceivably could be considered "in-
terstate commerce."142 Additionally, the federal government has, 
through its judicial power, the final say on what are the basic, irre-
ducible rights of individuals as against federal or state power to 
regulate. 148 
The states, subject to these specified limitations, have paramount 
power over all other aspects of the regulation, control, and discipline 
of community life.144 This pervasive dominion over intrastate affairs 
ed during legislative debate of the bill. Sanderson Interview, supra note 8. 
* J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237, at 449-50 (5th 
ed. 1911), construed by Prof. W. Ryckman's lecture, Boston University School of Law. 
137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
138. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
139. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
140. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
141. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
142. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
143. Id. art. III, § I, cl. 1 (federal judicial power is vested in one supreme court); id. art. I, § 
8, cl. 9 (Congress has the authority to establish in addition "Tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court"). I d. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 announces that "the judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . 
arising under this Constitution, and under the Laws of the United States." Id. 
Article VI declares that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding." Id. art. VI, cl. 2. Known as the supremacy clause, this constitu-
tional text was early in our history taken to mean that the people of the United States had 
chosen "to invest the general government" with "a permanent and supreme authority," in 
order to "prohibit to the states the exercise of any power. . . incompatible with the objects of 
the general compact." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 307 (1816). 
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I, 2, 3, enumerate certain specific prohibitions against the 
states. States cannot, for instance, enter treaties, coin money, or grant titles of nobility. 
1982-83] MASSACHUSETTS SITING ACT 739 
is referred to as the police power .146 Its scope typically extends to 
the control of the health, safety, and morals of a state's citizenry.146 
Under our system of government, this police power has belonged 
traditionally to states, not to their subdivisions. Any powers of self-
government held by municipalities have been seen as derivative of 
state power and not independently held.147 
The doctrine that municipalities possess no inherent rights of self-
government is known as Dillon's rule, after Professor Dillon's trea-
tise on municipal corporations. In accordance with Dillon's rule, 
"any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a particular 
power is resolved by the courts against the municipality and the 
power is denied." 148 The United States Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged the primacy of this doctrine, holding that in the absence of 
state constitutional provisions establishing independent rights, 
municipalities are mere departments of the state which can grant or 
withdraw privileges and powers as it sees fit.149 Dillon's rule, how-
ever, has been modified in many states by the passage of some form 
of Home Rule amendment to the state's constitution, or by the enact-
ment of a Home Rule statute. 
B. Dillon's Rule and Home Rule 
Home Rule amendments take a variety of forms and create differ-
ing degrees of autonomy. In some states the exercise of municipal 
Amendment X states that the "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." [d. 
amend. X. This has been interpreted as investing with the states the internal powers which 
they had traditionally exercised. "[I]t is perfectly clear, that the sovereign powers vested in 
the state governments, by their respective constitutions, remained unaltered and unimpaired, 
except so far as they were granted to the government of the United States." Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 307. 
145. The term "police," in this sense, is rooted in the Greek" 'polis,' a city, hence, a state," 
and refers generally to the control of a community. E. PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A SHORT ETYMO-
LOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH 509 (1958). 
146. "Police power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, 
safety, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential at· 
tribute of government." Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 883 (Mo. 1962). 
147. "[A]II sovereign authority 'within the geographical limits of the United States' resides 
either with 'the Government of the United States, or [with] the States of the Union. There ex· 
ist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two. There may be cities, counties, and 
other organized bodies with limited legislative functions, but they are all derived from, or exist 
in subordination, to one or the other of these.' " Community Communications Co. v. City of 
Boulder, _ U.S. _, 102 S. Ct. 835, 838 (1982) (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 
U.S. 375, 379 (1886». 
148. J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 
1911). 
149. City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923). 
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power is limited to specific, enumerated grants of power160 which are 
"scarcely more than constitutional authorization for the state legisla-
ture to delegate its power to cities."161 An arrangement such as this 
represents the most limited end of the Home Rule spectrum, the 
legislative supremacy model.162 
In other states, Home Rule grants to municipalities all powers of 
self-government over "local" affairs, without requiring the authori-
zation of or interference by the state legislature.163 This variety of 
Home Rule grant creates "an area of independence, however 
vague," into which the state theoretically cannot intrude. 164 
Arrangements like these represent the other end of the Home Rule 
spectrum, the imperio in imperium model-the sovereign within a 
sovereign. 166 
Home Rule in Massachusetts conforms to neither extreme. It con-
tains elements of both, and thus may be seen as a middle model. The 
Massachusetts Home Rule Amendment, adopted in 1966, provides 
that: 
Any city or town may, by the adoption . . . of local ordinances 
or by-laws, exercise any power or function which the general 
150. See, e.g., Canavan v. Messina, 31 Conn. Supp. 447, 334 A.2d 237 (1973) (interpreting 
that state's Home Rule statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. SS 7-194 (1975». 
151. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
269, 294 (1968). 
152. [d. at 293-96. 
153. California is one such state. See, e.g., Hubbard v. City of San Diego, 55 Cal. App.3d 
380, 127 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1976). 
COLO. CONST. art. XX, S 6, grants all of its cities and towns with populations over 2,000 the 
power to govern through their charters "all ... local and municipal matters," and provides 
that the charters and "ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede . . . 
any law of the state in conflict therewith." [d. But see Community Communications Co. v. City 
of Boulder, _ U.S. _, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). In Community Communications the Court 
limited the effect of such a grant of local autonomy by holding that a legitimate exercise of 
municipal Home Rule authority in Colorado does not enjoy state action immunity from an-
titrust challenge under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
154. Vanlandingham, supra note 151, at 285; 
155. St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1883). "The Latin 
imperare ... has derivative imperium, power over a family, over a great household, over a 
state, hence, supreme power, empire ... " E. PARTRIDGE, supra note 145, at 181. This form 
of Home Rule structure is highly reminiscent of the relationship of the federal government and 
states described supra text and notes at notes 143-47. The Supreme Court, however, ap-
parently does not accept the view that the two forms of relationship are completely analogous, 
as it has stated that "federalism ... contains its own limitation: Ours is a 'dual system of 
government,' which has no place for sovereign cities." Community Communications v. City of 
Boulder, _ U.S. _, 102 S. Ct. 835, 839 (1982) (citing with approval, "We are a nation not 
of 'city-states' but of States." Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 630 F .2d, 704, 
717 (1981». But see, the sharp dissent of J. Rehnquist in Community Communications,_ 
U.S. ___ 102 S. Ct. 835, 845 (1982). 
1982-83] MASSACHUSETTS SITING ACT 
court has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with 
the constitution or laws enacted by the general court in con-
formity to the powers reserved to it . . . and which is not 
denied . . . to the city or town by its charter. . . . 156 
741 
The element of this grant which resembles the legislative supremacy 
model is the requirement that a municipal exercise of power be not 
inconsistent with the laws enacted by the general court. This is a sig-
nificant substantive limitation, both a priori to municipal action, and 
as a potential legislative veto proviso. Municipal regulations must 
certainly conform to existing state law when adopted, but this is no 
guarantee of continuing legitimacy. Regulations "not inconsistent" 
with state law initially can be later overturned if the state adopts a 
general law which renders the otherwise consistent by-laws incom-
patible. 
There is also an element of Massachusetts Home Rule which draws 
on imperio in imperium principles. This is the allowance that a 
municipality may "exercise any power which the general court has 
the power to confer upon it." This means that Massachusetts munici-
palities need not wait for specific enabling legislation from the state 
before they may act, as must municipalities in enumerated powers 
jurisdictions. 167 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has had occasion 
to describe the changes wrought in the state's power structure by its 
Home Rule Amendment. Prior to 1966, Massachusetts operated 
under Dillon's rule, applying the philosophy that "what the State 
gave, it also could take away." 168 The legislature repudiated this doc-
trine by passing the Home Rule Amendment, which gave cities and 
towns a broad grant of "independent municipal powers which they 
did not previously inherently possess."169 One commentator has 
described the "independent powers of municipalities in the Common-
wealth" as these: "first, the power to adopt and amend a charter 
which may make broad changes in the local government structure 
156. Mass. Declaration of Rights, MASS. CONST. art. II, S 6. The Home Rule Proceedings are 
codified at MASS . .ANN. LAWS, ch. 43B, SS 1·19 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980). The "general court" 
is the quaint name by which Massachusetts refers to its state legislature. 
157. Vanlandingham, supra note 151, at 280. In one case, the Massachusetts SJC upheld a 
city ordinance creating a human rights commission enacted in the absence of specific enabling 
legislation, despite the existence of a state civil rights commission with an arguably similar 
scope of interest. See Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 293 N.E.2d 268 (1973). 
158. Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 356, 294 N.E.2d 
393,407 (1973). See Paddock v. Brookline, 347 Mass. 230, 238, 197 N.E.2d 321 (1964). 
159. Bd. Appeals Hanover, 363 Mass. at 358, 294 N.E.2d at 408. 
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without state legislative approval; second, the power, within a some-
what circumscribed area, to institute new programs on their own in-
itiative without securing prior state legislative approval."160 
The area for the proper exercise of local initiative remains unclear. 
Some of the limitations which circumscribe it, however, are set out 
explicitly in the Home Rule Amendment itself. By the terms of the 
power grant no municipality may regulate elections, levy or collect 
taxes, borrow money, dispose of park land, or enact laws "governing 
civil relationships," declaring felonies, or providing for punishment 
by imprisonment without express authorization of the state legisla-
ture.16l By contrast, the limitations that the Home Rule Amendment 
places on the state legislature are trivial. There are no limitations on 
the substance of legislative authority, only on the procedures 
through which that authority is exercised-and possibly some limita-
tion on highly disparate effects of that exercise. The legislature re-
tains the power to act in relation to municipalities as long as it does 
so "by general laws which apply alike to all cities or to all towns, or 
to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer than two, and by 
special laws" enacted according to specified procedures, including 
local petition.162 
Analogizing from the federal constitution, these restraints upon 
state power can be described as providing two levels of due process-
type163 controls to provide some democratic balance for centralized 
160. Brown, Home Rule in Massachusetts: Municipal Freedom and Legislative Control, 58 
MASS. L.Q. 29, 31 (1973). 
161. Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, AMEND. art. II, § 7. Violations by towns of their 
Home Rule powers typically run afoul of this section. For instance, the Massachusetts SJC 
found a local rent control law invalid as an attempt to govern a civil relationship-that between 
landlord and tenant. Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd., 357 Mass. 709, 260 
N.E.2d 200 (1970). The civil relationship prohibition has a saving clause under which 
municipalities may affect civil relationships, "as an incident to an exercise of an independent 
municipal power." MASS. CONST. AMEND. art. II, § 7. 
162. Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, MAss. CONST. AMEND. art. II, § 8, provides that: 
special laws [may bel enacted "(1) on petition filed or approved by the voters of a city 
Id. 
or town, or the mayor and city council, or other legislative body, of a city, or the town 
meeting of a town, with respect to a law relating to that city or town; (2) by a two-
thirds vote of each branch of the general court following a recommendation by the 
governor. 
The scope of the Home Rule Amendment restrictions upon the legislature's ability to enact 
statutes which restrict local legislation is narrow. Arlington v. Bd. Conciliation & Arbitration, 
370 Mass. 769, 773, 352 N.E.2d 914, 917 (1976), later proceedings, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 874, 375 
N.E.2d 343 (1978). 
163. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides that "no person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law .... " Id. The same restraint is imposed on state ac-
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power. One control is that the legislature, if it enacts a "special law" 
affecting a single locality or a select few, generally must follow pro-
cedures that rely on the consent of those localities. If the legislature 
bypasses the special procedures for special laws, the general laws 
which it enacts presumably must "apply alike" to every municipality 
of the state. Drawing on the federal constitutional analogy again, 
this latter provision may be seen as a kind of equal protection 
clause,164 applicable whenever the legislature passes a law of state-
wide effect.166 
In practice these may not be very great constraints on legislative 
power, but the legislature does not necessarily exercise all the power 
that it possesses to affect the details of municipal life. The legislature 
may through general law impose certain procedural restrictions on 
the way municipalities adopt and impose their own regulations. 
These procedural restrictions, in the form of enabling legislation, 166 
also confer or acknowledge large substantive areas of local regula-
tory powers. One of the primary areas of local control is the use of 
local land, especially as affected through the zoning power. Indeed, 
the Massachusetts SJC has held that municipalities do not enjoy zon-
ing power merely because the legislature has conferred it upon them 
through the Zoning Act.167 
In the case of Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals 
Committee,168 the Massachusetts SJC declared that the power to 
zone land is part of the "independent municipal powers included in 
the [Home Rule Amendment's] broad grant of powers to adopt ordi-
nances or by-laws for the protection of the public health, safety, and 
general welfare." 169 Since the legislature had the power to authorize 
municipalities to zone, the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment 
automatically vested that power directly in the municipalities them-
tion by incorporation of these federal prohibitions to the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
164. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, S 1, holds that no state shall "deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." For discussion of the question of whether 
municipalities are "persons" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment see infra text 
and notes at notes 287-99. 
165. For a fuller discussion of this issue see Brown, supra note 160, at 41-48. 
166. Enabling legislation is the specific delegation of power from a legislature or a directive 
as to how existing power is to be exercised. An example of the latter is the Massachusetts Zon-
ing Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, SS 1-22 (West 1979 & Supp. 1982). 
167. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, SS 1-22 (West 1979 & Supp. 1982). 
168. Bd. Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 294 N.E.2d 393 
(1973). 
169. 363 Mass. at 359, 294 N.E.2d at 409. 
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selves.17° This concept represents a radical departure from Dillon's 
rule. l71 One commentator has suggested that "no more complete and 
far-reaching, no more absolute reversal of the direction of govern-
mental authority has ever occurred in an American state."172 
Whether or not this is so, it is certainly true that Massachusetts 
municipalities have significant regulatory powers. The extent and 
limits of these powers is the subject of the next section of this article. 
c. The Home Rule Grant in Action: 
Municipal Power Over Private Land Use 
Most confrontations over the exercise of municipal power in 
Massachusetts take place between the makers of regulations and the 
businesses and individuals who are subject to them. Most land use 
disputes are of this nature; the state becomes involved in local land 
transactions only infrequently. It will be helpful, for purposes of 
comparison with the situation involving HWF siting under the Siting 
Act, to look at the more typical relationship betwen municipality and 
developer. In the typical case, the developer is a private person or 
company proposing a particular land use. The difference in the HWF 
context is that the private developer is operating under the aegis of 
state law. If it were not for the existence of the Siting Act and the 
privileges given developers thereby, such as the arbitration clause 
that essentially forces the town to bargain, HWF developers would 
be in the same position as ordinary private firms or individuals in 
their dealings with the municipalities in which they hoped to locate. 
Thus, it is instructive to explore the scope of municipal regulatory 
power over private land use and its limitations. This inquiry will pro-
duce a model of what hazardous waste facility development might be 
like without the Siting Act.173 
170. The court in Hanover stated: 
Municipalities are now free to exercise any power or function, excepting those 
denied to them by their own charters or reserved to the State . . . which the Leg-
islature has the power to confer on them, as long as the exercise of these powers is 
not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws enacted by the Legislature. . . . 
363 Mass. at 358, 294 N.E.2d at 408. 
171. See supra text and notes at notes 158-60. 
172. E. MARINER, THIS IS YOUR MASSACHUSETTS GoVERNMENT 39 (6th ed. 1970). See also 
Brown, supra note 160 at 54 n.35. 
173. There are certainly other conceivable social forms that the hazardous waste disposal 
enterprise could take. It could be structured like the existing civic services of sewage and con-
ventional solid waste disposal. Under the Siting Act, it resembles more the privately owned 
but highly regulated public utilities. 
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Despite the acknowledged power of Massachusetts municipalities 
to enact land use regulations, their exercise of that power is circum-
scribed and subject to scrutiny by the courts. Massachusetts courts 
analyze municipal lawmaking in the same way that they look at any 
other legislative action. Initially, a court will inquire whether the 
regulatory effort falls within the regulatory body's grant of substan-
tive power.174 If it does not, the court may invalidate the regulation 
by declaring it to be ultra vires-literally, an act that exceeds the 
municipality's authority. 
The courts of the Commonwealth will also examine, when called 
upon to do so, whether a municipal regulation infringes impermissi-
bly on the constitutional rights of individuals. Individual property 
rights are such that a regulation may not so restrict the permissible 
uses of land as to amount to a "taking" of private property without 
due process of law176 or without payment of compensation.176 Chal-
lenging plaintiffs may also try to persuade courts that the rules 
under attack are preempted by the rules on the same subject which 
have been enacted by another government authority to which the 
challenged rulemaker is subordinateY7 
174. In the case of municipalities, the sources would be specific enabling legislation or the 
Home Rule amendment itself. See Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 293 N.E.2d 268 (1973). 
175. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 227 U.S. 183 (1928); U.S. CONST. amends. V, 
XIV. 
176. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also supra note 132 (discussion of eminent domain). One 
Massachusetts case has suggested that certain wetlands protection by-laws might pose such an 
unconstitutional burden on the ownership of land. See Comm'r of Natural Resources v. S. 
Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104,206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has so 
far refused to accept the argument that a mere regulation of land use under the police power 
can constitute a "taking" for purposes of compelling the regulating government to pay the 
owner for the diminished market value of the land affected. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255 (1980). See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); annotation on this case at 
65 L. Ed. 106 (1980). 
177. Preemption is defined as that doctrine adopted by U.S. Supreme Court holding that 
certain matters are of such national, as opposed to local, character that federal laws 
"preempt," or take precedence over state laws. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (4th ed. 1979). 
Thus, states may not pass laws which are inconsistent with the federal law that governs the 
same subject matter, provided, of course, that the subject is one properly committed to federal 
control. See also supra text and notes at notes 137-48 (explaining division of power in govern-
ment, especially note 143 on the supremacy clause). Preemption is also an issue in the state-
municipal relationship, which has many analogies to the federal-state relationships. These are 
discussed in depth infra text and notes at notes 182-91. 
For purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that no federal statute preempts the Massa-
chusetts Siting Act. There is good authority for this position; the U.S. Supreme Court, in City 
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), held that RCRA did not preempt a New 
Jersey statute governing waste transport. Similarly, at least one federal court has held that a 
municipal ban on disposal of one particular hazardous chemical is not preempted by the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629. See SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 
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Challenges of municipal regulations by private developers have 
been typically unsuccessful, indicating that local power to regulate 
land use under Home Rule is broad.118 The Massachusetts SJC has 
explicitly held the zoning power to be part of the independent 
municipal powers granted under the Home Rule Amendment.119 
Other decisions have established that municipal regulatory power 
over land use extends beyond that conferred by the Zoning Act180 
and that non-zoning land use by-laws need not conform to the proce-
dural requirements of that Act.181 Municipal creation and regulation 
of flood plain districts182 and protected wetlands,183 for example, 
have been sustained on this basis. At least one case has held that 
regulations to preserve and maintain the ground water table are 
specifically within local authority .184 
Since the Home Rule Amendment deposed the reign of Dillon's 
rule in Massachusetts,18S the state courts have been liberal in con-
struing the scope of local regulatory powers. Yet, even before Home 
Rule, state courts analyzing the validity of municipal regulations 
have operated from a presumption "in favor of the validity of an 
ordinance, and [where] its reasonableness is fairly debatable the 
judgment of the local authorities . .. will prevail."186 A municipal 
regulation ordinarily will be sustained where it has a reasonable rela-
519 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. Ohio 1981). It should be noted, however, that federal preemption doc-
trine in application is not precisely analogous to the state-local relationship. The hazardous 
waste context raises more thorny issues than can be properly considered in this article. 
178. See, e.g., Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n, 379 Mass. 7,13-14,393 N.E.2d 858,860 
(1979) (the Massachusetts SJC upheld the refusal of the Town of Dennis on Cape Cod to allow a 
developer to build a road over an ecologically fragile cranberry bog); Am. Sign & Indicator 
Corp. v. Town of Framingham, 1980 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 101, 103, 399 N.E.2d 41, 43 (1980) 
(Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the town's efforts to regulate sign height and other fac-
tors of display); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 
(1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973) (Massachusetts SJC upheld decision of town not to 
grant a special permit to developer who wanted to build apartment houses on a parcel of land 
periodically flooded by the Charles River). 
179. Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 359, 294 N .E.2d 
393, 410 (1973). 
180. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A SS 1-23 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981). 
181. See, e.g., Am. Sign & Indicator Corp. v. Town of Framingham, 1980 Mass. App. Adv. 
Sh. 101, 103, 399 N.E.2d 41, 43. 
182. Turnerv. Town of Walpole, 1980 Mass. App. Adv. Sh.1745, 409 N.E.2d 807; Turnpike 
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972). 
183. Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n, 379 Mass. 7, 393 N.E.2d 858 (1979); MacGibbon v. 
Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 512 (1976). The latter case involved a wetlands by-
law adopted pursuant to the Zoning Act. 
184. Turnpike Realty, 362 Mass. 221, 227-28, 294 N.E.2d 891, 896-97 (1972). 
185. See supra text and note at note 170. 
186. Schertzer v. Somerville, 345 Mass. 747, 751, 189 N.E.2d 555, 559 (1963). 
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tionship to some legitimate purpose,187 does not exceed the terms of 
the municipality's own authority, and violates no constitutional 
standards. 
If developers of hazardous waste facilities were to approach Mas-
sachusetts municipalities on the same footing as other private devel-
opers, the Massachusetts courts would probably uphold the validity 
of reasonable local regulations and permit requirements that might 
apply to them. Hazardous waste facility developers, however, enjoy 
a preferred status under the Siting Act. By proceeding in accordance 
with the site assignment procedure under the Act, developers are 
able to invoke the authority of the state-and as against the state 
municipalities remain subordinate. Thus, the special provisions of 
the Siting Act apparently undermine municipal authority under 
Home Rule with respect to proposed HWF siting. 
D. The Home Rule Grant: Municipal Power and State Override 
As might be expected, it is not only private landowners and 
developers who come into conflict with local land use regulations. 
The state, acting through its agencies and licensees, can make provi-
sions for land use that conflict with municipal designations and re-
quirements. The early case law held unequivocally that state-owned 
property was exempt from local licensing188 and zoning189 require-
ments. It was not even necessary for purposes of establishing 
187. 345 Mass. at 751, 189 N.E.2d at 559; Turner v. Town of Walpole, 1980 Mass. App. 
Adv. Sh. 1745,409 N.E.2d 807. Similarly, where the application of a particular ordinance is 
supported by substantial evidence, a court will be inclined to uphold it. See, e.g., Lovequist v. 
Conservation Comm'n, 379 Mass. 7, 393 N.E.2d 858 (1979); Turnpike Realty, 362 Mass. 221, 
233-34,284 N.E.2d 891,901-02 (1972). A reviewing court will demand such support. Findings 
of fact must dovetail with the permissible goals of the ordinance for a local land use decision to 
survive challenge. In one celebrated case, a landowner was denied by a local board of appeals a 
special permit to excavate and fill marshland three times in the course of 14 years. Three 
times, and with increasing vexation, the Supreme Judicial Court annulled the decision of the 
board. See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690, 200 N.E.2d 254 (1964); 
MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); MacGib-
bon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 512, 340 N.E.2d 487 (1976). 
The SJC saw the town's reasons for denying the permit as inapposite to legitimate regula-
tory ends. The Court held, for instance, that "the preservation of the ocean food chain and 
other public benefits of land in its natural state did not provide a legally tenable ground for de-
nying the permit." MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 512, 518, 349 
N.E.2d 487, 493 (1976). As to public health dangers alleged to be posed by flooding and erosion 
due to the filling of the site, the Court held these could be "decreased to an acceptable level by 
appropriate conditions and safeguards." 369 Mass. at 519, 340 N.E.2d at 494. 
188. Teasdale v. Newell & Snowling Construction Co., 192 Mass. 440, 78 N.E. 504 (1906). 
189. Medford v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 344 Mass. 50, 181 N.E.2d 584 (1962). 
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exemption from local regulation that the land belong to the state if it 
were being used in a manner designated by the state. The plaintiffs 
in Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Mass. Turnpike Authority,19o contested 
the propriety of a state plan to relocate a factory displaced by an ex-
pansion of the Massachusetts turnpike. The Massachusetts SJC 
upheld the plan, even though the new factory site was to be taken 
from a private owner by eminent domain, and the land was zoned for 
exclusively residential use. 
There was some thought at the time the Home Rule Amendment 
was adopted that municipalities were acquiring greater powers to 
prevent these sorts of unwanted state intrusions. Subsequent court 
decisions rapidly dispelled this theory. The signal case of the series, 
Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee,191 
arose as a challenge to the override provisions of the state's "Anti-
Snob Zoning" law. The boards of appeal of Hanover and Concord 
had denied building permits to developers seeking to build low- and 
moderate-income housing. The towns claimed to have denied the per-
mits not only because the proposed dwellings violated the local zon-
ing by-laws, but because the projects posed public health threats as 
well. In one case, the developer was said to have failed to submit 
sewerage plans acceptable to the responsible agencies; in the other, 
detriment to public health and safety was alleged, due to "severe 
subsurface water conditions."192 
Both developers appealed to a state agency, the Housing Appeals 
Committee, which had been designated by statute193 to hear such ap-
peals and to vacate local board decisions which were "unreasonable" 
and "not consistent with local needs." 194 In both cases, the Commit-
tee reversed the local decisions and ordered the issuance of building 
permits. Both local boards sought judicial review. They challenged 
not only the legitimacy of the substantive decisions made by the 
Housing Appeals Board, but also challenged the authority of the 
state, under the recently adopted Home Rule Amendment, to pro-
vide by statute for override of municipal determinations. 
190. Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Mass. Turnpike Authority, 348 Mass. 107, 202 N.E.2d 602 
(1964). 
191. Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm'n, 363 Mass. 339, 294 N.E.2d 
393 (1973). This case has been already discussed at length for its pronouncements on local 
power. See B'Upra text and.notes 158-70. 
192. Bd. of Appeals ofHaMIJeT, 363 Mass. at 343 & n.1, 344 & n.3, 294 N.E.2d at 397 & n.1, 
398 & n.3 (1973). 
193. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 40B, SS 20-23 (MichielLaw. Co-op. 1980), inserted by Mass. Acts 
1969, ch. 774, § 1, the so-called Massachusetts "Anti-Snob Zoning" law. 
194. Bd. of Appeals of HaMIJeT, 363 Mass. 339, 366, 294 N.E.2d 393, 420 (1973). 
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On the substantive issues, the Massachusetts SJC conceded that at 
least one site was "beset by difficult water problems." 195 It found, 
though, that there was substantial evidence that the developers' 
plans would provide an adequate solution to the water problem.196 
These findings of the SJC illustrate how narrow the function of a 
reviewing court is in determining the propriety of a state agency's 
override of a local ordinance or permit determination. Where the 
agency is bound to a decisionmaking standard made explicit in the 
statute, the court will inquire only whether the agency's decision has 
been based on "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support the conclusion."197 Under the Massachusetts 
Administrative Procedure Act, a court may set aside a state agency 
override decision where it is "unsupported by substantial evidence"198 
in cases where the agency's mandate calls for factfinding. In this 
case, the SJC found that the evidentiary burden had been met. 
As to the facial attack on the override provisions of the statute, the 
SJC found no violation of municipal rights under the Home Rule 
Amendment. According to the court, Home Rule increased local 
power without altering the basic power structure. When direct con-
frontation with the general laws of the state occurs, local powers are 
clearly subordinate. The SJC viewed the problem as purely one of 
authority. 
Municipalities can pass zoning ordinances or by-laws as an exer-
cise of their independent police powers but these powers cannot 
. be exercised in a manner which frustrates the purpose or imple-
mentation of a . . . law enacted by the Legislature. . . . [T]he 
Home Rule Amendment has not altered the Legislature's su-
preme power in zoning matters. . . . [The challenged statute] 
is a proper exercise of the powers reserved to the Legislature by . 
[the Home Rule Amendment] because it is a general law which 
applies to two or more municipalities. . . . [T]he statute's 
grant of power . . . to override local zoning . . . which would 
otherwise frustrate the statute's objective ... does not violate 
the Home Rule Amendment.199 
Nor is substantive fairness an element of Home Rule analysis. 
While the instant statute in Hanover set minimum housing obliga-
195. 363 Mass. at 382, 294 N.E.2d at 431. 
196. 363 Mass. at 382-83, 294 N.E.2d at 432. 
197. 363 Mass. at 375-76, 294 N.E.2d at 415-16. 
198. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A 14(8)(e) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980). This is the standard in 
appeals from final decisions of agencies in adjudicatory proceedings, as defined id. S 1(1), (2). 
199. Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 360,294 N.E.2d 
393, 418 (1973). 
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tions, which if met foreclosed mandatory override of local decisions, 
state override in cases when the minimum was already met was still 
permitted.20o For a statute to be valid under Home Rule it is not nec-
essary that the burden of serving the state's legislative purpose be 
evenly distributed among the municipalities of the Commonwealth. 
The Massachusetts SJC views a Home Rule challenge not as a 
" 'town's rights' case, nor a 'county's rights' case, but rather as a 
question of legislative intent."201 
Cases decided subsequent to the adoption of the Home Rule 
Amendment indicate that "while the scope of the authority granted 
to municipalities to act on municipal problems is very broad, the 
scope of the disability imposed on the Legislature by the amendment 
is quite narrow."202 Even where legislative action singles out a 
municipality for disparate treatment, a court is likely to sustain the 
state's desires against Home Rule objections.203 Individual munici-
palities have had unique burdens placed on them by the legislature 
through laws of purportedly general application.204 Municipalities 
may still be chosen by the state as the locations for public facilities 
which may decrease property values and threaten public safety with-
in the community. In one case, the Conservation Commission of the 
Town of Dartmouth sued the County Commissioners of Bristol to 
stop the construction of a jail on a site which was not zoned for such 
use.206 The Massachusetts SJC upheld a declaratory judgment that 
the commissioners charged with siting the jail did not have to apply 
for a zoning variance. The Court said that "an entity or agency 
created by the Massachusetts Legislature is immune from municipal 
zoning regulations (absent statutory provision to the contrary) at 
least insofar as that entity or agency is performing an essential gov-
ernment function." 206 
Judge Wilkins, dissenting from the majority's opinion in this case, 
took issue with the principle that "every grant of eminent domain to 
a state entity or agency . . . contains an implied right to disregard 
200. 363 Mass. at 366-67, 294 N.E.2d at 422-23 (1973). 
201. Cty. Comm'rs of Bristol v. Conservation Comm'n of Dartmouth, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1289, 1300, 405 N.E.2d 637, 646 (1980). 
202. Director of Div. of Water Pollution Control v. Uxbridge, 281 N.E.2d 585 (Mass. 1972). 
203. The state legislature must follow special rules in enacting such special laws. MASS. 
CONST. AMEND. art. II, § 8. See supra note 162. 
204. A general law, to meet such definition need apply to only two municipalities at 
minimum. See supra text and note at note 162. 
205. County Comm'rs of Bristol v. Conservation Comm'n of Dartmouth, 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1289, 1290-91, 405 N.E.2d 637, 638-39 (1980). 
206. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1293, 405 N.E.2d at 641. 
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explicit, lawful, local restrictions." 207 Judge Wilkins felt that due 
regard for Home Rule should require that state override powers be 
recognized only where they have been explicitly conferred by the leg-
islature.208 
It should be noted that such explicit override provisions exist in 
some statutes. The Department of Public Utilities (DPU), for in-
stance, has the express power to exempt public utilities from local 
zoning ordinances.209 The zoning provisions of the Siting Act, how-
ever, are not phrased in terms of exemption. They prohibit munici-
palities from adopting in the first instance any zoning change which 
would exclude a HWF from a proposed site.210 This zoning regula-
tion and the regulatory restrictions posed by section 16 of the Siting 
Act211 raise the issue of another state power alluded to previously,212 
the power of state preemption of local regulation. 
E. The Home Rule Grant in Action: 
Municipal Power and State Preemption 
Even broad grants of legislative autonomy to local governments 
remain subject to the preemptive effect of statutes enacted at the 
state level. "State legislation may preempt local ordinances even in 
Home Rule states. The easy preemption cases are those in which a 
207. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1301, 405 N.E.2d at 647. 
208. [d. at 1301, 405 N.E.2d at 647. The strength of J. Wilkens' dissent is buttressed by the 
fact that the cases relied on by the majority to support a general override power were all decid-
ed before the Home Rule amendment was adopted. 
209. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, S 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1973) provides that <I[l]ands or 
structures . . . to be used by a public service corporation may be exempted . . . from the 
operation of a zoning ordinance . . . if . . . the department of public utilities, shall . . . find 
that the ... use ... is reasonably necessary for the convenience or welfare of the public." 
[d. 
210. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 410A, S 9. This section was undoubtedly adopted to foreclose the 
sorts of problems which have obstructed HWF construction in other jurisdictions, as indicated 
by the following newspaper story: 
N.H. town rejects waste plant 
The Merrimack, N.H. Planning Board has rejected plans by a Lynnfield, Mass., 
company to build a chemical waste treatment plant in town. Applied Chemical Tech-
nology, trying for more than four months to win town approval for its plant, says it 
will appeal the 6-1 vote. The board invoked a zoning ordinance that permits 18 kinds 
of industries in Merrimack, none of them a chemical waste treatment plant. The town 
zoning board can grant exceptions to the ordinance, and that may be the company's 
next step, said planning board Chairman Nelson Disco. The plant, proposed for a 4.5 
acre site on the Merrimack River, would recycle hazardous industrial solvents. 
Boston Globe, I)ecember 18, 1981, at 33. 
211. See supra text and note at note 135. 
212. See supra text and note at note 177. 
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state statute expressly envelops and occupies an area, forbidding 
localities any measure of control over the subject matter."213 
Bloom v. Worcester,214 the case which most explicitly describes 
post-Home Rule preemption in Massachusetts, adopts as an analytic 
tool the analogy of the federal preemption doctrine.215 It states that 
the same process of ascertaining legislative intent must be per-
formed in both instances.216 The Massachusetts SJC noted that any 
legislation may be presumed to be preemptive when it deals with a 
subject comprehensively and explicitly describes what municipalities 
can and cannot do in relation to that subject.217 Such legislation is 
deemed to preclude any exercise of local power which would 
frustrate the purpose of the statute. 
There are some conceptual differences between the doctrines of 
state override and state preemption. Preemption is a blanket 
prohibition of the exercise of local power over a particular subject 
matter. Override is a piecemeal abeyance of an otherwise legitimate 
213. D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GoVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 
216-17 (1977). 
214. Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136,293 N.E.2d 268 (1973). 
215. 363 Mass. at 151, 293 N.E.2d at 280. The Massachusetts equivalent of the federal 
supremacy clause is the requirement in S 6 of the Home Rule Amendment, MASS. CONST., 
AMEND., art. II, and in S 13 of the Home Rule Procedures Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 43B, § 13 
(MichielLaw. Co-op. 1980) that "a local ordinance or by-law is not inconsistent with any gen-
erallaw within the meaning of those words." Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 155, 293 
N.E.2d 268, 280 (1973). See also supra text and note at note 77 (on federal preemption). 
216. 363 Mass. at 155, 293 N.E.2d at 280 (1973). 
217. The Massachusetts SJC, in Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136,293 N.E.2d 268 (1973), 
created a simple standard for determining preemption: that the legislative intent to preclude 
local action be clear. "The Legislature may, of course, explicitly forbid certain local action [by 
municipalities]." 363 Mass. at 155 & n.13, 293 N.E.2d at 280 & n.13 (1973). 
If the legislature has made no explicit indication of its intention to preempt, an intention to 
bar local ordinances and by-laws purporting to regulate the same subject may be inferred from 
the circumstances. Legislation which deals with a subject comprehensively, describing (per-
haps among other things) what municipalities can and cannot do, may be deemed to preclude 
the exercise of any local power over the same subject, because otherwise the legislative pur-
pose of that statute would be frustrated. For example, even if § 7 of the Home Rule Amend-
ment did not deny municipalities the power to borrow money or to levy, assess and collect 
taxes except pursuant to legislative authority, the existing general laws concerning those sub-
jects are so comprehensive that an inference that the Legislature intended to preempt those 
fields would be fully justified. 363 Mass. at 155, 293 N.E.2d at 280. 
A conclusion that the legislature intended to preempt a subject may also be inferred if the 
legislature has explicitly limited the manner in which cities and towns may act on that subject. 
In most jurisdictions, comprehensive statutes are generally seen as totally preemptive, regard-
less of whether the intent to preempt has been made explicit by the legislature. See, e.g., Coun-
ty Comm'r of Bristol v. Conservation Comm'n of Dartmouth, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1289,405 
N.E.2d 637; So. Ocean Landfill, Inc. v. Mayor & Council, 64 N.J. 190, 314 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1974); 
Cleveland Elec. IlIum. Co. v. City of Painesville, 15 Ohio St.2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968); City 
of So. Burlington v. Vermont Elec. Power Co., Inc., 133 Vt. 438, 344 A.2d 19 (1975). 
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local regulation.218 At times these concepts blur, as when a statutory 
provision for override such as the DPU zoning exemption power 
previously described is characterized by a court as a preemptive 
measure.219 This blurring is evident in the Massachusetts SJC's dis-
cussion of County Commissioners of Bristol v. Conservation Com-
mission of Dartmouth, involving the Bristol County jail. 220 The 
Massachusetts SJC's reference in that case to state "supremacy" in 
zoning matters suggests the preemption doctrine.221 Such an ap-
proach would be appropriate in the context of federal versus state 
power, where federal supremacy is an explicit dictate of the United 
States Constitution. 222 Yet the exercise of what might be deemed an 
analogous power of the state is described variously as preemption, 
exemption, and override, depending on the form it takes or the man-
ner in which it is characterized. As earlier discussion has demon-
strated, it can be of consequence to municipalities which of these dif-
ferent manifestations of the same power the legislature chooses to 
use.223 
The interplay of these different concepts and the interpretation of 
them by the courts is illustrated by the series of cases that will be 
discussed next. These cases may be viewed as a paradigm of the con-
flict of state versus local power over the construction of a hazardous 
though arguably necessary facility. The purpose of introducing these 
cases here is twofold. First, they illustrate the way that the highest 
court of this state, the Massachusetts SJC, applies the fairly abstract 
218. The example of zoning provides a model of these differences. Imagine a state which has 
no Home Rule amendment, no Zoning Act, and no zoning. The state legislature decides that 
zoning would be a good thing, and creates a comprehensive zoning plan that includes every 
municipality in the state. By virtue of such a legislative plan preemption would occur. The 
legislature, however, could delegate to its municipalities the responsibility for local zoning 
plans, and at the same time reserve power in the state to grant zoning variances when it chose 
to. Towns could then initiate valid zoning plans, but each time the legislature granted a 
variance it would override the town's otherwise legitimate exercise of power. Moreover, the 
state itself would be exempt from submitting to the zoning plans of its subordinate parts, the 
municipalities. 
219. New England LNG Co. v. Fall River, 368 Mass. 259, 265-67, 331 N.E.2d 536, 540-41 
(1975). 
220. See supra note 201. 
221. New England LNG Co. v. Fall River, 368 Mass. 259, 265, 331 N.E.2d 536, 541 (1975). 
222. See supra note 143. 
223. Both preemption and override are exercises of the same basic power-namely, state 
sovereignty or supremacy; but the two allow very different scopes of power to municipalities. 
Where there is preemption, municipalities may not act at all. Reservation of override power by 
the state gives municipalities general freedom to act which is subject to veto in certain circum-
stances. 
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concepts discussed above in concrete fact situations. The cases also 
show how abstract issues of power often eclipse concrete environ-
mental concerns in litigation, especially at higher appellate levels. 
F.The New England Liquefied Natural Gas Cases 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) does not pose many of the problems 
presented by hazardous waste. The Massachusetts SJC has stated 
dismissively that LNG does not create a significant threat of harmful 
ecological effects by water or air pollution.224 It does, however, share 
one important quality with many hazardous wastes: it is remarkably 
explosive.226 An LNG facility also has a major aesthetic impact, even 
compared to other heavy industrial uses. The gas liquefication and 
storage facility which New England LNG (NELNG) proposed to 
build on Mount Hope Bay in Fall River in 1971 was designed to in-
clude three storage tanks 107.5 feet high and 250 feet in diameter, 
each holding 600,000 barrels of LNG, impounded by a dike 17 feet 
high; two pipelines connecting the facility with a pier; an adminis-
trative building; and another structure to house liquefication 
machinery.226 The City of Fall River at the time required that per-
sons storing gas products and other flammable substances first ob-
tain a license from the City. This was a generally applicable regula-
tion, promulgated under the City's explicit authority under the Zon-
ing Act to "secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers."227 
The owners of the property abutting the proposed LNG facility 
site won an injunction in the Superior Court228 preventing NELNG 
from using the site without first obtaining a license from the 
224. Save the Bay, Inc. v. Dep't of Public Utilities, 366 Mass. 667, 684, 322 N.E.2d 742,756 
(1975). 
225. See H. WESSON, ed., AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE MITIGATION OF FLAMMABLE 
VAPOR DISPERSION AND FIRE HAZARDS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING LNG SPILLS ON LAND, Report 
to the American Gas Association by University Engineers, Inc., February 1974; Storage and 
Handling of LNG, Document No. 59A, Section 4222, National Fire Protection Association. 
226. Pereira v. New England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 109, 111, 301 N.E.2d 441, 443 (1973). 
227. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, S 3 (West 1980). Most Massachusetts municipalities 
are likely to have similar regulations. It is also likely that municipalities would try to use what 
licensing and permit requirements they have to obstruct HWF development, since § 16 of the 
Siting Act both forbids the adoption of new requirements applicable to HWFs, and requires 
that all required licenses and permits be granted or denied within 60 days of application for 
them, or within 21 days after establishment of a siting agreement. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
210, S 16 (West 1981). 
228. The Superior Courts in Massachusetts are trial courts of general jurisdiction over civil 
matters. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 212, § 84; ch. 214, § 1 (West 1981). The suits brought by 
Warren and Haverhill challenging the HWF siting process under the Siting Act will be heard 
first by Superior Courts in Worcester and Middlesex Counties respectively. See supra note 46. 
• 
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municipal authorities.229 The Massachusetts SJC overturned this de-
cision in Pereira v. New England LNG Co., Inc., holding that a 
municipal license was not required.280 The SJC reasoned that the leg-
islature, by vesting control of gas companies in the Department of 
Public Utilities (DPU), by giving DPU the power to grant zoning ex-
emptions to public utilities, and by requiring state licensing of gas 
companies, had evidenced an intent to preempt the field of gas com-
pany regulations.281 This state preemption by specific legislation was 
found to have superseded the general municipal licensing power. 282 
The SJC stated that, "[t]o hold otherwise would impute to the Legis-
lature an intent to Balkanize the Commonwealth and to permit a 
single municipality to deny access to such vital services to any and all 
other municipalities." 288 
Undaunted, a local citizens' group calling itself Save the Bay, Inc., 
brought an appeal to the Massachusetts SJC challenging the DPU 
grant of a zoning exemption for the LNG facility.284 The petitioners' 
charges were that NELNG was not a public service corporation eligi-
ble for the exemption under the statute and that DPU in granting 
the exemption had incorrectly applied the statutory standard of 
"reasonably necessary for the convenience or welfare of the 
public."285 The Massachusetts SJC, in Save the Bay, Inc. v. Depart-
ment o/Public Utilities,236 upheld both DPU findings as questions of 
fact which were supported by substantial evidence. 
Some interesting points come out of the Massachusetts SJC's anal-
ysis of the evidence supporting the administrative adjudication of the 
DPU. In determining that NELNG was a public service corporation, 
the court appeared to place great weight on the federal certification 
of NELNG's services and the fact that the Federal Power Commis-
sion viewed importation of LNG as "an act in interstate commerce 
subject to certain of the Commission's jurisdictional 
229. Pereira v. New England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 109, 110, 301 N.E.2d 441, 442 (1973). 
230. 364 Mass. at 113, 301 N.E.2d at 445. 
231. 364 Mass. at 115-23, 301 N.E.2d at 446-52. 
232. 364 Mass. at 118-19, 301 N.E.2d at 449-50. 
233. 364 Mass. at 121, 301 N.E.2d at 451-52. 
234. Save the Bay v. Dep't of Public Utilities, 366 Mass. 667, 322 N.E.2d 742 (1975). The 
abutters and an unincorporated association of local citizens joined as plaintiffs against DPU 
(which was exercising legislative override powers which had been delegated to it under MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 10). 
235. 366 Mass. at 671, 322 N.E.2d at 745 (citing MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 10 
(1979), predecessor to ch. 40A, S 3 (West 1981». 
236. 366 Mass. at 678-87,322 N.E.2d at 751-52. 
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powers."237 What the SJC does with this language is to suggest 
without embracing the argument that the matter is not subject to a 
state court's discretion because it has been federally preempted.238 
The argument evokes the majestic tenor of federal supremacy 
without invoking its specific application to the case. In this vague, 
amorphous form, the federal preemption argument is simply an im-
pressive piece of legal makeweight. It does not clarify the problem of 
the respective areas of federal, state, and local jurisdiction over 
LNG. It is important to be aware of this dynamic in potential 
Massachusetts SJC decisions, because it can be an important ground 
for nonsuit or unfavorable decision. It might be useful to think of the 
technique as a kind of reverse abstention doctrine.239 That is, where 
the Massachusetts SJC perceives a significant federal regulatory 
participation in some field of endeavor, it will often treat that field as 
federally preempted and defer to a perceived federal policy without 
really engaging in minimal preemption analysis. As between the 
state and a municipality, the court apparently considers the state as 
the exclusive agent in implementing such perceived federal policies. 
This is a potentially important factor in state court decisions about 
hazardous waste, since there are major federal statutes on the sub-
ject.240 Despite the fact that these federal statutes seem clearly 
designed not to preempt state and local regulation and have been in-
terpreted by federal courts as not preempting state and local regula-
tion,241 state courts, including the Massachusetts SJC, will doubtless 
look to federal statutes for guidance. Consider the likely reaction of 
the SJC to the following statement of federal policy: 
While EPA has always believed that states should have the right 
to set pollution control standards more restrictive than the Fed· 
237. 366 Mass. at 679-80,322 N.E.2d at 753-54. 
238. This is a tactic that the Massachusetts SJC has employed in other contexts as well. See, 
e.g., Bishop v. Klein, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 857, 402 N.E.2d 1365 (1980), where the SJC de-
clined to assign as reversible error a trial judge's refusal of a defendant's motion under the 
MASS. R. CIV. P. 34 that the court compel a personal injury plaintiff to produce medical treat-
ment records from a Veterans Administration Hospital. Though these records could have been 
released upon plaintiffs written request, the SJC found that under federal regulation, "the 
decision as to ultimate disclosure ... rests with the [V.A.] administrator." 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 860, 402 N.E.2d at 1368. See also supra note 177. 
239. The abstention doctrine refers to the policy of federal courts to refrain from deciding 
cases which rest upon open questions of state law which could yet be settled in the state courts, 
in order to avoid excessive federal interference in state self-governance. Abstention is usually 
a discretionary matter; an exercise of judicial self-restraint in the interest of comity. See, e.g., 
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 
167 (1959). 
240. See supra note 23. 
241. See supra text and note at note 177. 
.. 
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eral standards, it would be a matter of national concern if this 
principle were to become the basis for refusal by states to share 
in the national responsibility for finding safe means for the prop-
er disposal of hazardous substances.242 
757 
Although this is a statement of an administrative agency and not one 
of Congress, it is likely to influence all state appellate courts in their 
deliberations on hazardous waste issues. It is likely to sway state 
courts toward finding that many local hazardous waste regulations 
are merely obstructionist or indicative only of a desire to share in the 
national responsibility in a limited capacity. 
Another notable aspect of the Massachusetts SJC's review of the 
evidence in Save the Bay is more conventional, but important in the 
context of the regulation of hazardous activities. This is the extreme 
deference that the court gave to the judgments of designated state 
agencies in carrying out their assigned functions. The SJC did not 
deny that the LNG facility could pose safety problems, but found 
"that the Department of Public Utilities fully inquired into relevant 
factors to determine possible hazardous and detrimental ef-
fects. . . . It is not for us independently to redetermine those 
issues."24s The SJC stated that it was "not insensitive to the special 
hardships that the proposed facility may have in its area of immedi-
ate impact," but noted that the zoning exemption clause was based 
on a recognition of the "absolute interdependence of all parts of the 
Commonwealth." 244 
Nevertheless, Fall River persisted in its efforts to save the bay-or 
to Balkanize the Commonwealth, depending on one's point of view. 
In October of 1973, while the appeal of the DPU zoning override was 
still pending, the city amended its general ordinances, as distinct 
from zoning ordinances, to effectively prohibit construction of the 
LNG facility on the DPU-approved site. The city council announced 
that it was taking this action "in the interest of public safety, as it 
relates to fire and explosion."245 New England LNG brought suit 
against Fall River when, pursuant to the new ordinance, the city 
building inspector refused to issue a building permit for construction 
of the LNG facility.246 Citing its original decision in the controver-
242. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1979). 
243. Save the Bay, Inc. v. Dep't Public Utilities, 366 Mass. 667, 685, 322 N.E.2d 742, 758 
(1975). 
244. Save the Bay, 366 Mass. at 686·87,322 N.E.2d at 759-60. 
245. New England LNG Co. v. Fall River, 368 Mass. 259, 262·63, 331 N.E.2d 536, 539-40 
(1975). 
246. Fall River, 368 Mass. at 263, 331 N.E.2d at 540. 
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sy,24.7 the Massachusetts SJC, in New England LNG Co., Inc. v. Fall 
River4.S again held in favor of the supremacy of the state's delega-
tion of authority over the gas facility to DPU. Reciting the state 
preemption doctrine set forth in Bloom v. Worcester,24.9 the SJC ex-
plained that the state statutory scheme must prevail over the city's 
attempted regulation.260 The Horne Rule objection was held inap-
plicable, and the building permit was ordered to be issued. The total 
delay in construction of the LNG facility was three and one-half 
years. 
The LNG cases are instructive because they illustrate some likely 
outcomes of state-municipal scenarios that might arise over HWF 
siting. Should a municipality refuse to grant an otherwise legitimate-
ly required license or permit, the SJC will reverse where it finds the 
denial "based on a legally untenable ground, . . . unreasonable, 
whimsical, capricious or arbitrary."261 A specially adopted regula-
tion, like Fall River's October, 1973, anti-LNG ordinance, could be 
struck down summarily as a violation of section 16 of the Siting 
Act.262 It seems clear that to have any hope of being sustained by re-
viewing courts, local regulations should deal directly and rigorously 
with the problem, not simply force it out of the community through 
building or zoning ordinances .. Local hazardous waste regulation 
must not take a form which would indicate that the community is 
simply trying to abdicate responsibility for the hazardous waste 
problem. 
V. DOES THE SITING ACT VIOLATE THE HOME RULE 
PROVISIONS OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION? 
The Siting Act clearly constitutes a comprehensive legislative 
scheme for dealing with the toxic chemical disposal facility siting 
problem in Massachusetts.263 As such, it creates an inference of leg-
islative intent to preempt the field. Nevertheless, these statutory 
247. Pereira v. New England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 109, 301 N.E.2d 441 (1973). 
248. Fall River, 368 Mass. at 263, 331 N.E. at 540. 
249. See supra text and note at note 217. 
250. Fall River, 368 Mass. at 267, 331 N.E.2d at 543. 
251. MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639, 255 N.E.2d 347, 350 
(1970). See also supra note 187. 
252. See supra text and note at note 135. 
253. Conceptually, the Siting Act and the Hazardous Waste Management Act, MAss. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, SS 1-12 (West 1981), should be considered together as evidence of legis-
lative intent to regulate completely and uniformly all aspects of the hazardous waste problem. 
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provisions leave room for a certain amount of municipal regulation. 
The preemption is not total; nor is it always clear. 
For instance, the Siting Act authorizes the acquisition of a pro-
posed site by eminent domain;264 yet the terms of the authority 
granted to the Department of Environmental Management 
(DEM)266 limit the exercise of eminent domain to certain conditions: 
"All permits, licenses, and approvals of the City or town wherein the 
site lies" must have been granted, and a majority of the members of 
the municipality's governing body must vote in favor of the eminent 
domain acquisition.266 The Siting Act contemplates that some 
municipal regulations remain in force. Local regulations still apply, 
but up to a point that is not determined by the usual measure. 
As the cases show, the ordinary standard used to determine state 
preemption is whether the local ordinance is incompatible with, or 
frustrates the general purpose of the comprehensive state law. 
Under the Siting Act, the only condition for total state preemption is 
that the local regulation be one recently adopted, thereby constitut-
ing a zoning change to exclude a facility. Section 16 of the Siting Act 
sets the effective date of the Act itself as the cut-off date for deter-
mining which municipal licensing and permit requirements may be 
applied to HWFs. The Zoning Amendment sets the date of receipt of 
a notice of intent by the town as the time limit beyond which the 
town may not adopt "any zoning change which would exclude the 
facility. . . ." 267 
These preemption contours are very odd. While the typical pre-
emptive statute applies a blanket prohibition equally to all municipal-
ities,268 this one does not. Zoning change, of course, is forbidden any 
municipality faced with a HWF developer's notice of intent. Section 
16, however, is not so evenhanded. One town might have a licensing 
254. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, S 17 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980). See also note 132 supra. 
255. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 16, S 19 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980). 
256. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 17 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980). The Siting Act seems to pay 
deference to local permit and licensing procedures only in the eminent domain context; com-
pliance with such regulations is not listed among the elements of the Siting Agreement. [d. S 
12. Section 16 states that "[a]ll permits and licenses required for a hazardous waste facility [in 
a municipality] shall be granted or denied within 60 days after application ... or twenty-one 
days after the establishment of a siting agreement ... whichever is the later." [d. § 16. (em-
phasis supplied). Nowhere, however, does the Siting Act provide for automatic reversal of the 
denial of any permit or license, so long as it was required prior to adoption of the Siting Act. 
257. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, S 9. 
258. See, e.g., Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 155 n.13, 293 N.E.2d 268, 286 n.13 
(1973) (citing the example of a statute that prohibits municipalities from offering their employ-
ees any group insurance programs other than those authorized by state law). 
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requirement which clearly frustrates the siting of a HWF; yet 
according to this statutory scheme its applicability is preserved so 
long as it predates the Siting Act. Another town might adopt a licen-
sing requirement which is not fatally inconsistent with the Siting 
Act, but if adopted after July, 1980, the requirement will be invalid 
as applied to a HWF. No inquiry will be made into its merit or into its 
ultimate compatibility with the Siting Act. In sum, section 16 
discriminates in favor of municipalities which had permit and licens-
ing requirements applicable to HWFs prior to July, 1980. It 
discriminates against municipalities that had no such requirements. 
An article written by Massachusetts Senator Robert Wetmore,269 
who was co-chairman of the state's Special Commission on Hazard-
ous Waste comments that the Siting Act "avoids state override of 
local decisions and focuses instead on making proposed facilities ac-
ceptable to communities. In the words of one reporter, it represents 
'a blending of political expediency and the latest in academic wis-
dom.' "260 The Siting Act does avoid the draconian measure of over-
ride. As we have seen, though, it may accomplish the same ends in a 
less direct and predictable manner through its preemptive provi-
sions. The Siting Act deliberately leaves in place existing local regu-
lations, but by freezing those regulations as of the date of the Siting 
Act, it virtually guarantees that some towns will be left vulnerable 
by their own regulatory patterns which they will be unable to 
change. 
Of course, section 16 and the Zoning Amendment may be viewed 
not merely as limitations on local power. In fact, they may be consid-
ered as limitations on state power. Just as the state as sovereign can 
override local zoning regulations,261 so can the state overturn local 
ordinances which conflict with a preemptive statute.262 Indeed, the 
Massachusetts SJC has declared that an "agency created by the 
Massachusetts Legislature is immune from municipal zoning regula-
tions (absent statutory provision to the contrary)."268 This would in-
dicate that in addition to the express powers conferred by the Siting 
Act, the DEM also has zoning override power because the Siting Act 
259. R. Wetmore, Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act, submitted to EPA, 
reprinted in Environmental News, Aug. 8, 1980 (Available from Sen. Wetmore's office). 
260. [d. at 1. 
261. County Comm'r of Bristol v. Conservation Comm'n of Dartmouth, 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1289,405 N.E.2d 637. 
262. New England LNG Co. v. Fall River, 368 Mass. 259, 331 N.E.2d 536 (1975). 
263. County Comm'r o/Bristol, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1293, 405 N.E.2d at 641 (emphasis 
added). 
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does not explicitly withdraw it. Yet, in adopting the Siting Act, it 
was apparently the legislative intent that DEM not have zoning over-
ride power, even though it is clearly within the authority of the state 
to confer such power on one of its agencies. 
Why was the statute drafted this way? Senator Wetmore's de-
scription of the Siting Act264 speaks of "carefully balanced decision-
making,"265 and prevention of "the development of an adversarial 
atmosphere."266 He also says that "political reality required any suc-
cessful [statute] ... to avoid strong state override, due to the Com-
monwealth's deeply ingrained value of strong home-rule. "267 
Another observer has put it more bluntly: that the current legisla-
ture would not have voted to accept the Siting Act had it contained 
such curtailments of local power.26S 
What the Siting Act may in fact represent is not the repudiation of 
state override, but the transformation of override from its histori-
cally autocratic form to a more sophisticated and democratic form. 
Certainly, override was contemplated when the Siting Act was 
drafted. Earlier drafts of the bill contained explicit override provi-
sions269 which were deleted before the bill's passage.270 The remain-
ing mandatory arbitration provision may ultimately accomplish the 
same ends that override would.271 The difference is more than one of 
form and style, because it is based on local participation. Under 
traditional override, a state decision could be presented to an unwill-
ing municipality as fait accompli.272 Assuming that hazardous waste 
disposal could have come under the necessary characterization as a 
public work (or public service corporation), the state could have 
created a statutory scheme in which it had the power to choose a site, 
take the site by eminent domain, and effectively exempt the project 
from all local land use control through the override provisions of a 
totally preemptive statutory scheme. 
264. Wetmore, supra note 259, at 1. 
265. [d. 
266. [d. at 2. 
267. [d. at 3. 
268. Interview with Carol Greenleaf, Administrative Assistant to Sen. Carol Amick, in 
Boston, May 13, 1982. 
269. Sanderson Interview, supra note 8. 
270. [d. 
271. See supra notes 130-32. 
272. See, e.g., County Comm'r of Bristol v. Conservation Comm'n of Dartmouth, 1980 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1289,405 N.E.2d 637 (1980); Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Mass. Turnpike Auth., 348 
Mass. 107, 202 N.E.2d 602 (1964). 
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The actual statutory scheme shows much more respect for the 
principle of local autonomy that underlies Home Rule. The existing 
scheme is not without its coercive effect, but at least the compulsion 
is that the municipality negotiate with the developer, rather than 
stand by helpless and enraged as the development takes place inde-
pendently of local ordinances. This is one good reason why the Siting 
Act as adopted, with its greater respect for local autonomy, would 
have been more politically palatable than the Siting Act as originally 
envisioned. 
It could be, too, that the state had doubts about its own power to 
exercise override on behalf of a HWF siting. A state agency can pos-
sess the zoning override power only to the extent that it is using that 
power to perform an "essential government function." 273 Is provid-
ing for hazardous waste disposal such a function? A hazardous waste 
facility is not, after all, a state agency, instrumentality, or a public 
work. It is the profit-making business of a private developer. 
Still, there is power in the analogy of HWFs to public service cor-
porations.274 Even if the analogy by itself is not strong enough to 
bring HWFs under the public utilities statute, it will probably be 
enough for courts to justify the state's exercise of extraordinary 
powers on their behalf. HWFs bear many of the attributes of the 
public service corporation as described in Fall River. 275 They are 
part of an industry licensed by the state, highly regulated by state 
and federal law, and assisted and supervised by a state agency. They 
provide a service that a highly industrialized society cannot do with-
out. Waste disposal in its more conventional forms has typically been 
centrally organized and performed by government. Even without 
the provision for honoring prior local licensing requirements, the ex-
ercise of eminent domain on behalf of a HWF would probably be 
upheld as a taking for public, and not private, purposes.276 
273. County Comm'r of Bristol v. Conservation Comm'n of Dartmouth, 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1289, 1293,405 N.E.2d 637, 641. 
274. Whether a hazardous waste facility might be considered a public utility or a public serv-
ice corporation for purposes of the zoning override provision of MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, S 3, 
or any other legal purpose, is a very interesting question. The argument against HWFs being 
public utilities might include the fact that HWFs are under the jurisdiction of DEM and not 
that of DPU. Also, the special HWF zoning regulations of ch. 40A, S 9 would not have been 
necessary if ch. 40A, S 3 already applied. On the other hand, if one were to apply the purely 
evidentiary, matter-of-fact test used in the Fall River case, 368 Mass. 259, 331 N.E.2d 536 
(1975), for determining whether a business is a public service corporation, a good case could be 
made that HWFs, like ordinary waste dipsosal plants, fit this description. 
275. Fall River, 368 Mass. 259, 261, 331 N.E.2d 536, 539 (1975). 
276. See, e.g., Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Mass. Turnpike Auth., 348 Mass. 107, 202 N.E.2d 
602 (1964). The SJC, however, has ruled that "[l]and cannot be taken by eminent domain with 
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There would seem to be no inherent limit on the state's power to 
override any local regulations obstructing HWFs, if the state chose 
to do so. Yet, what the state has chosen to do is to create a statute 
which exercises discriminatory preemption. What the Siting Act 
does, with its grandfather clause for in-place local regulations, is to 
provide more autonomy for municipalities which have already exer-
cised it, while preempting such self-determination for others. This 
was undoubtedly a political accommodation made to facilitate the 
passage of the statute as an emergency measure. A HWF is not as 
innocuous as a water treatment plant or electrical transmission lines. 
Representatives of communities already zoned to exclude industrial 
waste disposal would not have voted for passage of a law which ap-
peared to provide for the override of exclusionary zoning by-Iaws.277 
The Siting Act, then, is very different structurally from the Massa-
chusetts "Anti-Snob Zoning" law. That law, relentlessly democratic, 
was drafted deliberately to introduce low- and middle-income hous-
ing into any of the state's municipalities, regardless of efforts they 
might have made to exclude such construction. The Siting Act, on 
the other hand, has been drafted so as to pose no threat to munici-
palities that are currently zoned to exclude industry, and little threat 
to those with exclusionary licensing and permit regulations. The 
Siting Act was made politically palatable by just this design. If the 
selective preemption scheme and effect of the Siting Act is valid, 
then exclusively zoned and regulated communities will not be 
threatened by the siting of a HWF. HWFs may only be built in 
municipalities where industrial land use is already permitted. Fur-
thermore, municipalities which have not passed protective regula-
tions are now precluded from adopting or changing their local regu-
lations so as to allow them to join their more exclusively-zoned 
neighbors. 
the intent to transfer it to private individuals for their own use." 297 Mass. 567, 571, 8 N.E.2d 
753,757 (1937). But Bee Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 
N.W.2d 455 (1981). InPoletown, a city redevelopment agency took a parcel ofland by eminent 
domain to sell to an auto manufacturer for the purpose of building an assembly plant. The 
highest court of Michigan sustained the taking, on the grounds that the jobs and tax base pro-
vided were a "public benefit," to which private gain by the business corporation was deemed 
"incidental." While this is not a Massachusetts decision, it does show the lengths to which 
modern courts are willing to go to accommodate the institutions of our highly industrialized 
society. See also Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). 
277. What the Siting Act did instead was prohibit zoning change in communities faced with 
a proposed siting, declaring HWF operation to be a rightful use on any land currently zoned 
for industry. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, S 17 (West 1981). 
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The central question is whether a state may discriminate among its 
political subdivisions in this manner. One could make an argument 
that the Siting Act violates the Home Rule Amendment because it 
does not "apply alike" to all municipalities of the Commonwealth. At 
least two towns are exempt from its application altogether;278 others 
are not affected because they have no land zoned for industrial use. 
Towns with regulations predating the Siting Act have more autono-
my under that statute than those that do not. The Massachusetts 
SJC has so far declined to attach any special significance to the word 
"alike" in the Home Rule Amendment. Instead, the SJC has upheld 
the validity of both genera}279 and special280 legislation that place 
unique burdens on particular municipalities. 
This author has been able to discover only two instances in which 
the Massachusetts SJC has found state legislation to violate the 
Home Rule Amendment. One of these was a purportedly general bill 
to end the electoral practice of proportional representation which ex-
isted only in the City of Cambridge.281 The Massachusetts SJC 
struck it down as being, in fact, a speciallaw282 which had not been 
278. See supra note 43. 
279. Brown, supra note 160, at 45-47 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 357 Mass. 831, 258 
N.E.2d 731 (1970). This opinion arose out of a course of special legislative acts authorizing the 
town of West Springfield to take water from the town of Southwick. Southwick filed a bill, 
purportedly as Special Legislation, to limit the amount of water which could be drawn. The 
SJC discussed and upheld the bill as general legislation, finding that the bill "by precisely the 
same language, affects Southwick and West Springfield and has legal effect in those towns, 
which constitute 'a class of no fewer than two' towns." 357 Mass. 831, 835, 258 N.E.2d 731, 
735 (1970). The opinion does not analyze or explain the requirement that general legislation 
"apply alike." 
280. In County Comm'r of Bristol v. Conservation Comm'n of Dartmouth, the justices 
engage in this analysis: 
The special legislation in question in the instant case, St. 1973, c. 412, states as its 
purpose the construction of a new jail in Bristol County. Since Bristol County repre-
sents a class of two or more cities and towns, this section complies with S 8. Section 2 
of the statute provides that the county commissioners may take by eminent domain or 
acquire by purchase 'any land and buildings that may be necessary for said purposes.' 
This provision is also valid under S 8 since it does not specify the land of any city or 
town in particular. Thus, the statute satisfies the requirements of S 8 and is valid 
under the Home Rule Amendment. 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1289, 1293,405 N.E.2d 637,641 (1980). 
281. Belin v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 530, 288 N.E.2d 287 (1972). 
282. The court held that the legislation was 
phrased in general terms, and is, arguably, potentially applicable to cities in addition 
to Cambridge at some indefinite future time, is not sufficient to meet the test which S 
8 of [the Home Rule Amendment] establishes. When enacted, [the bill] ... was 
applicable in fact only to Cambridge. That it was phrased in general or specific terms 
does not control under S 8 which prescribes a clear and simple test of minimum appli-
cability. In Opinion of the Justices, 387 Mass. 831, we pointed out relative to an act 
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enacted according to the requisite procedures under the Home Rule 
Amendment.283 The other was a bill to authorize the transfer to a 
private university of the corpus of a specific bequest originally made 
to the City of Boston by Benjamin Franklin.284 The SJC held that it 
was a piece of special legislation which would require a Home Rule 
petition from the City of Boston in order to comply with the Home 
Rule Amendment.285 In neither case did the court find it necessary to 
construe the "apply alike" requirement. It is unlikely that the SJC 
could be persuaded that this language provides equal protection of 
the laws for municipalities in the same manner that the federal 
constitution requires that equal protection under the law be extend-
ed to individuals. 286 
The question which naturally arises is whether Massachusetts 
municipalities could raise a claim under the equal protection clause of 
the United States Constitution. It could be contended that the classi-
fication scheme here, which discriminates in favor of existing local 
regulations, must be rationally related to the state's purposes in 
enacting the Siting Act in order to pass constitutional muster. The 
following section will consider whether this statutory scheme of the 
Siting Act deprives Massachusetts municipalities of the equal protec-
tion of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
VI. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN 
STATE-MUNICIPAL RELATIONS 
This section of the article represents a departure from what has 
come before. Until now, the inquiry has focused on whether the Sit-
ing Act is in violation of the Massachusetts Constitution, specifically 
its Home Rule Amendment. A review and analysis of existing case 
affecting the towns of Southwick and West Springfield that it met the test of a gener-
allaw within the meaning of the first sentence of art_ 89, S 8, and, hence, did not need 
to be enacted in accordance with the special procedures for speclallaws there defined. 
That case involved two towns, a situation quite different from that which confronts us 
here. 
362 Mass. 530, 535, 288 N.E.2d 287, 292 (1972). 
283. See B'Upra text and note at note 162. 
284. Opinion of the Justices, 374 Mass. 843 (1972). 
285. [d. at 850-51. 
286. It is not surprising that the SJC should hesitate in the face of such an undertaking. 
Disparate modes of land use regulation among different municipalities are generally manifes-
tations of variation in economic power, and even the Supreme Court has avoided problems of 
"economic equal protection." See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
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law and legal thinking indicates that the Siting Act's restrictions on 
municipalities' regulatory powers are not violative of the Home Rule 
Amendment. Thus, any challenge of the Siting Act which adopts the 
position that it conflicts with Home Rule is likely to be untenable. 
This section will explore the avenue of federal constitutionality in an 
effort to discover other possible legal defects in the Massachusetts 
statute. 
The discriminatory preemption scheme of the Siting Act may well 
be perceived as violative of the equal protection clause. Unfortunate-
ly, it has been held that "municipal corporations have no standing to 
invoke the contract clause or the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution in opposition to the will of their 
creator"287 and that "the power of the State and its agencies over 
municipal corporations is not restrained by the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."288 This principle, while unfailingly ap-
plied by the federal courts, seems not to be dictated by any express 
constitutional provisions. The cases that espouse this doctrine do not 
ascribe to it textual roots, they simply recite earlier decisions adher-
ing to similar rules.289 Ultimately, the courts conclude only that "the 
principles announced and applied in these cases have been reiterated 
and enforced so often that the matter is no longer debatable."290 
The principle that is at work here appears to be not one of constitu-
tionallaw as such, but of federalism. It seems to be a kind of absten-
tion doctrine, akin to that relied upon in the relatively recent United 
States Supreme Court decision, National League of Cities v. 
Usery.291 The plaintiffs in Usery were cities and states contesting the 
propriety of an act of Congress which sought to extend the federal 
minimum wage requirements to municipal employees. The plaintiffs 
did not deny that the matter of minimum wages was within the scope 
287. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 (1939). 
288. Risty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 378, 390 (1926). See also 
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933), which attacked a 
Maryland law exempting a railroad from city property taxation. Against an equal protection 
challenge, Mr. Justice Cardozo presented the Court's opinion that a municipal corporation may 
assert no privileges or immunities against the state, which is its creator. Note, however, that 
dicta in some Supreme Court opinions suggest that municipalities might have constitutionally 
protectable rights in property that they own in their private rather than public and govern-
mental capacity. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil 
Co., 250 U.S. 394, 397 (1919). 
289. E.g., City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923). 
290. Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co., 250 U.S. 394, 399 (1919). 
291. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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of the Commerce Clause292 and thus within the plenary power of 
Congress to regulate generally. They argued, however, that the Con-
stitution barred Congress from applying such legislation against 
them in their governmental capacity as states. Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority of five in Usery, upheld the contentions of 
the plaintiffs on the surprising-and seemingly insubstantial-textu-
al basis of the tenth amendment. 293 
The dissenting opinions invoked the long-held maxim that the 
"tenth amendment states but a truism." 294 Commentators296 and 
courts296 have explained the Usery decision not in terms of constitu-
tional compulsion, but of prudential considerations. The Usery deci-
sion expresses policy based on the recognition that total federal 
regulatory preemption "would impermissibly threaten the signifi-
cance of state governments as viable autonomous entities in the fed-
eral structure."297 Similar values undoubtedly lie behind the refusal 
of the federal courts to hear fourteenth amendment claims of munici-
palities against states. 
It should be noted that while municipalities may not bring such 
claims against states, residents of municipalities are not barred from 
complaining that state actions arbitrarily discriminating among 
municipalities have deprived them, as citizens, of their constitutional 
rights.298 The cases which established the latter doctrine, however, 
involved gross, obvious manipulations of municipalities by states for 
the purpose of adversely affecting the voting rights of individuals. 
Voting rights are considered so fundamental as to trigger the high-
est level of judicial scrutiny. In general, the issue of state delegation 
of power to municipalities has been held to be nonjusticiable.299 Put 
simply, despite the problems involved in the Siting Act, it would be 
extremely difficult to sustain the claim that the Act deprives citizens 
292. Id. at 841. 
293. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. 
x. 
294. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 862 (1976) (quoting United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 124 (1940». 
295. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-22 (1978). 
296. SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
297. Id. at 983. 
298. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). This 
problem was apparently recognized and provided for by those responsible for the litigation 
f!led in challenge to the Siting Act by the town of Warren, as individual citizens have been 
joined with the town as parties plaintiff. See supra note 46. 
299. See, e.g., Kramer v. Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
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of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or that it vio-
lates equal protection or any other substantive constitutional guar-
M~. • 
This is not to say that such arguments could not be made. For in-
stance, when a regulation affecting real property decreases the value 
of that property significantly, it is possible to argue that the regula-
tion amounts to a "taking" for public purposes without due process 
or compensation to property owners.300 So far, such arguments have 
met with little success.301 It might be possible, too, to make an argu-
ment that the interests of a citizenry in good health are infringed by 
permitting certain kinds of hazardous waste disposal. There is little 
or no case law to support such contentions, at least as constitutional 
arguments. At present, these are but theories, the merits of which 
have not yet been established. As devices in litigation, they are histo-
rically premature, and cannot carry the day. It remains to be seen 
whether municipalities can marshal legal theories with the breadth 
and depth to support an action in opposition to a hazardous waste 
facility siting which is conducted in accordance with a state law such 
as the Siting Act. 
VII. WHAT CAN A POOR TOWN Do? 
The following section outlines some of the other possible legal 
theories upon which a municipality might proceed to prevent or con-
trol the construction of a hazardous waste facility. At the very least, 
these approaches will help to ensure that even if construction of a 
HWF cannot be prevented, the HWF will be located properly and 
operated as safely as possible. The section will necessarily be 
sketchy. Each of its subsections could easily be the topic of an entire 
article beyond the scope of this one; think of it as a map for explora-
tion. 
A. Common Law Remedies: Nuisance 
Hazardous waste disposal may seem to be a modern problem, but it 
is only a variation on a very old theme. To permit anyone to do abso-
lutely what he likes with his property in creating noise, odors, or 
300. Kiernan v. Portland, Oregon, 223 U.S. 151 (1911). See supra notes 175-76. 
301. Massachusetts landowners are not entitled to compensation for diminution of value of 
land due to the states exercise of its police power. Locatelli v. City of Medford, 287 Mass. 560, 
192 N .E. 57 (1934). But 866 Comm'r of Natural Resources v. Volpe, 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E .2d 
666 (1965); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
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danger of fire, would be to make property in general valueless. To be 
really effective, therefore, the right of property must be supported 
by restrictions or positive duties on the part of the owners, enforced 
by the state.302 Uses of land which are harmful or unpleasant to the 
surrounding community have a long social and legal history. One 
scholar reports that the first English smoke abatement law was 
passed in 1273, and that in 1308, someone was executed for using 
coal in a furnace in violation of a Royal Proclamation.303 The typical 
action that came to be brought against the medieval polluter, how-
ever, was the assize of nuisance. The remedy granted where 
nuisance was adjudged was that of abatement, a judicial decree that 
the offensive activity be ended. By the time of Blackstone, this had 
become the action on the case for nuisance, and the damages which 
were granted usually compelled a voluntary abatement, since the de-
fendant would be "ill-natured" to continue an activity which would 
incur such an ongoing cost.304 
Abatement was, and is, a drastic remedy. Consider a suit brought 
in England in 1757 against the operators of a chemical manufactur-
ing facility "at the parish of Tickenham, near the King's common 
highway there, and near the dwelling-houses of several of the inhabi-
tants. . . ." 305 The defendants were in the business of producing 
"acid spirits of sulphur [dilute sulphuric acid], oil of vitriol [cons en-
trated sulphuric acid], and oil of aqua fortis [dilute nitric acid]." The 
indictment described these substances as "noisome, stinking and of-
fensive liquors,"306 which made the air "impregnated with noisome 
and offensive stinks and smells; to the common nuisance of all the 
King's liege subjects. . . ." 307 The report on the evidence offered in 
this case stated that "the smell was not only intolerably offensive, 
but also noxious and hurtful, and made many persons sick, and gave 
them head-aches. . . ." 308 Although the defendants urged that 
there was no sufficient charge of the harm from their activity, a find-
ing was made against them, and "the nuisance was absolutely 
302. Cohen, Property and Scyvereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 21 (1927). 
303. C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE·USE OF UR· 
BAN LAND 169 (1977). 
304. [d. at 154, 155 (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 221). 
305. Rex v. White & Ward, 1 Burr. Rep. 333, 97 Eng. Rep. 338 (King's Bench 1757). 
306. [d. These "offensive liquors" were not, of course, without legitimate utility. Sulphuric 
acid was then used to produce indigo dye, and nitric acid to make ink and to etch metal. 
307. [d. 
308. [d. 
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removed; (the works being demoli~hed, and the materials, utensils 
and instruments, all sold and parted with;) .... "309 Upon a pro-
mise not to renew the operation, the defendants were each fined only 
six shillings and eight pence. 
As illustrated, abatement was the traditional remedy for a land use 
deemed to be a common or public nuisance, "the doing of or failure to 
do something that injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of 
the public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or 
injury to me public."310 What constitutes a public nuisance is fre-
quently, though not necessarily, defined by statute311 and such activ-
ities are often labeled nuisances per se. Unlike the tort of private 
nuisance,312 the action for public nuisance may fairly be described as 
quasi-criminal in nature, and may still be remedied by an order of 
abatement.313 
One expert on land use law has pointed out that although public 
and private nuisance law have had separate historical developments 
and are "far apart conceptually . . . [c ]ourts still weave the terms 
together," and litigation techniques such as the class action "cause 
even further blurring." 314 This blurring seems to have been a factor 
in creating the perception that nuisance was not likely to be a suc-
cessful avenue for those in pursuit of injunctive or abatement reme-
dies against polluters.316 Indeed, actions for private nuisance against 
those causing harm to land by the discharge of industrial chemicals 
have been notoriously unsuccessful.316 
309. [d. 
310. w. PRoSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS S 88, at 583 n.29 (4th ed. 1971). Public nuisance must 
be distinguished from the tort of private nuisance, a use of land which substantially interferes 
with the use or enjoyment of the land of other private individuals (usually abutters) and not of 
the general public. [d. Injunction can be the remedy granted for private nuisances too, and the 
same activity can be simultaneously a public and a private nuisance. See, e.g., Wood v. Picillo, 
443 A.2d 1244 (R.1. 1982). Private nuisance could be a fruitful theory in actions against 
hazardous waste disposers; however, it is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses upon 
municipal remedies. For more on the private nuisance theory see, Comment, A Private 
Nuisance Approach to Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 7 OHIO No. LAW 86 (1980). 
311. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 139, 55 1-20; ch. 111, 5 144 (West 1981). 
312. See supra note 310. 
313. See, e.g., Peters v. Township of Hopewell, 534 F. Supp. 1324 (D.N.J. 1982), where the 
plaintiff successfully brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 against a town for mali-
ciously conducting a properly issued order of abatement of a nuisance on his property. 
Generally, however, the constitutionality of the abatement power has been upheld as a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). 
314. C. HAAR, supra note 303, at 125. 
315. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). 
316. [d.; Rose v. SoconyVacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411,173 A. 627 (1934); Smith v. Staso Mill-
1982-83] MASSACHUSETTS SITING ACT 771 
This failure of the nuisance action to yield injunctive relief against 
pollution by industrial effluents is tied to the equitable nature of the 
injunctive remedy.317 Injunctions are issued in the discretion of the 
court, not as a matter of right to the prevailing party. 318 In determin-
ing whether to issue an injunction, a court will engage in a balancing 
test that weighs the harm to the plaintiff against the harm that the 
injunction would cause the defendant.319 When deciding whether to 
enjoin an alleged nuisance, one consideration which the courts will 
weigh is the utility of the conduct which is said to create the 
nuisance. 320 
It is easy to see that when this balancing formula is used private 
landowners suing in nuisance will rarely, if ever, prevail against an 
industrial defendant, and several cases illustrate the problem. In 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement CO.,321 an injunction was denied because 
of the "large disparity in economic consequences of the nuisance and 
the injunction."322 The "disparity" noted by the court was between a 
$45 million factory employing more than 300 workers, and plaintiffs 
who had by then suffered damages of $185,000 from air pollution 
caused by the operation of the cement company. 
Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp.324 was an early hazardous waste 
case in which the defendant was an oil rElfinery that discharged gaso-
line and other petroleum and waste products onto its land and into 
basins and ponds of water there.325 The polluted water percolated 
through the soil to the neighboring fifty-seven acre farm of one 
Manuel Rose, where it poisoned his water well and stream.326 One 
hundred and thirty-six of Rose's pigs and 700 of his hens died from 
drinking the contaminated water, and Rose was forced to obtain 
drinking water for his animals and his family elsewhere.327 The high 
court in Rhode Island sustained the oil company's demurrer to the 
ing Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927). 
317. See C. HAAR, supra note 303, at 154-57. 
318.Id. 
319. See, e.g., Cheney v. Packaging Industries Group, Inc., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189,405 
N.E.2d 106 (1980); Leubsdorf, The Standardfor Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 
525 (1978). 
320. See Bemis v. Clark, 28 Mass. 452 (1831); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS SS 822-828. 
321. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). 
322. 26 N.Y.2d at 220,257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 313. 
323. C. HAAR, supra note 303, at 151 n.10. 
324. Rose, 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934). 
325. 54 R.I. at 413, 173 A. at 628. 
326. Id., 173 A. at 628. 
327. Id., 173 A. at 628. 
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complaint,S2S rejecting both of Rose's theories of liability. The court 
declined to accept the authority of Rylands v. Fletcher, which im-
poses strict liability on landowners who keep on their land things 
which create hazard upon escape.329 The court went even further in 
refusing to find the existence of nuisance in the absence of negli-
gence. sso Then it looked to the 19th century case law of water rights 
to determine whether there had been negligence, ultimately finding 
that since "courses of subterranean water are as a rule indefinite 
and obscure ... rights relating to them cannot well be 
defined. . . ." 3S1 
Although the court in Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp. found no neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant, the concluding paragraphs of its 
opinion indicate that the court actually was weighing the relative 
economic benefits and costs of granting relief to the plaintiff in its 
determination of whether either a nuisance existed or the defendant 
had been negligent. 
It will be observed that in jurisdictions holding that, even 
though there is no negligence, there is liability for the pollution 
of subterranean waters, the predominating economic interest is 
agricultural. 
Defendant's refinery is located at the head of Narragansett 
Bay, a natural waterway for commerce. This plant is situated in 
the heart of a region highly developed industrially. Here it pre-
pares for use and distributes a product which has become one of 
328. 54 R.I. at 411,173 A. at 627. 
329. 54 R.I. at 416, 173 A. at 629 (citing Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330). 
Rylands v. Fletcher laid down the rule that "the person who, for his own purposes, brings on 
his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at 
his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the 
natural consequence of its escape." [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 335. 
Interestingly enough, Massachusetts is one of the minority of American jurisdictions which 
have adopted this rule, at least where the land use if unusually hazardous. In Clark·Aiken Co. 
v. Cromwell Wright Co., 367 Mass. 70, 323 N.E.2d 876 (1975), the Massachusetts SJC an· 
nounced tht "[a]fter careful consideration, we conclude that strict liability as enunciated in the 
case of Rylands v. Fletcher, is, and has been, the law of the Commonwealth." 367 Mass. at 73,' 
323 N.E.2d at 879. The SJC cited with approval the proposition that "One who carries on an 
abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability from harm. . . resulting from the activity 
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent such harm." 367 Mass. at 89,323 N.E.2d 
at 892 (quoting from the proposed RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SS 519, 520 (Tent. Draft 
No. 10». Considering that Massachusetts recognizes this sweeping basis of non-negligence 
liability for dangerous land uses, it is surprising that any hazardous waste facility developer 
would have the slightest interest in locating in this Commonwealth. 
330. Rose v. Socony·Vacuum Co., 54 R.I. 411, 414,173 A. 627, 628·29 (1934). Traditionally, 
nuisance actions have been based on the harmfulness of the land use. Questions of negligence 
or intention were not relevant. 
331. 64 R.I. at 420, 173 A. at 631. 
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the prime necessities of modern life. It is an unavoidable inci-
dent of the growth of population and its segregation in restrict-
ed areas that individual rigpts recognized in a sparse settled 
state have to be surrendered for the benefit of the community as 
it develops and expands. If, in the process of refining petroleum, 
injury is occasioned to those in the vicinity, not through negli-
gence or lack of skill or the invasion of a recognized legal right, 
but by the contamination of percolating waters whose courses 
are not known, we think that public policy justifies a determina-
tion that such harm is damnum absque injuria. SS2 
773 
Recent developments in nuisance law, however, indicate that 
courts are ready to make significant departures from such reason-
ing, at least in suits brought for public nuisance. In Village of Wil-
sonville v. SeA Services, Inc.,sSS a village in Illinois recently won an 
injunction against the continued operation of a hazardous waste dis-
posal landfill. The trial court, concluding that the site constituted a 
public nuisance, also ordered its operators to "remove all toxic waste 
buried there, along with all contaminated soil . . . and to restore 
and reclaim the site."ss4 This relief was obtained against a HWF that 
a toxicologist-consultant to EPA called "the most advanced scientif-
ic landfill in the country. . . ." 335 
The village had assembled an impressive body of evidence against 
the HWF in order to prove that it presented a hazard to the health of 
the citizens of the village, the county, and the state.S36 The trial rec-
ord in the case comprised over 13,000 pages and included the expert 
testimony of geologists, mining engineers, a biochemist, and a 
chemist who also had a degree in environmental health. Evidence 
was introduced that the chemicals disposed of at the site, which in-
cluded PCBs, cyanide, paint sludge, asbestos, pesticides, mercury, 
and arsenic, could cause pulmonary diseases, cancer, brain damage, 
and birth defects. SS7 The plaintiffs introduced no evidence to show 
that chemicals at the site had in fact caused such health problems. 
The only testimony as to the present harm created by the facility was 
that of townspeople who complained of dust, odors, and occasional 
spills on the streets of chemicals being delivered to the site. The n-
linois Supreme Court admitted that these problems alone would not 
332. 54 R.1. at 421,173 A. at 631-32. 
333. Village of Wilsonville v. SeA Services, Inc., 86 m.2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981). 
334. 86 m.2d at 4,426 N.E.2d at 827. 
335. 86 Ill.2d at 9,426 N.E.2d at 831. 
336. 86 D1.2d at 4,426 N.E.2d at 827. 
337. 86 m.2d at 5, 426 N.E.2d at 828. 
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have justified the granting of the drastic relief given the village, but, 
when "consdiered together with the other evidence indicating that 
the air, water and earth in and around the site will become contami-
nated, the trial court's relief was not excessive."SS8 
This other evidence referred to was entirely speculative and based 
on probabilities. Plaintiff's experts testified as to the possibility of 
earth subsidence and fractures, a likelihood enhanced by the fact 
that the landfill had been built on top of an abandoned coal mine. The 
expert witnesses also testified that chemicals at the site could leach 
through the soil and contaminate underground water. The trial court 
deemed this a serious consequence, despite the fact that the village 
bought its entire water supply from another town and that only one 
of its seventy-three private wells was used for drinking water.SS9 The 
court also gave great credence to testimony that chemicals at the site 
could undergo" 'explosive interaction,' resulting in chemical explo-
sions, fires, or emissions of poisonous gases. . . ." S40 
The point of this recitation is to show the power of well-assembled 
scientific evidence. Though the defendant's experts vigorously chal-
lenged the testimony and the qualifications of the plaintiff's experts, 
they did not in the eyes of the court "overcome the natural and 
logical conclusions which could be drawn from the evidence."s41 The 
court found that it was highly probable that the site would "consti-
tute a public nuisance if, through either an explosive interaction, mi-
gration, subsidence, or the 'bathtub effect,' the highly toxic chemical 
wastes deposited at the site [escape and contaminate the air, water, 
or ground around the site]. . . . A court does not have to wait for it 
to happen before it can enjoin such a result."s42 
Wilsonville is an Illinois case which has no parallel among Massa-
chusetts decisions. It does, however, have a local counterpart. Only 
338. 86 Ill.2d at 13, 426 N.E.2d at 834. 
339. 86 Ill.2d at 5, 426 N.E.2d at 828. 
340. 86 Ill.2d at 8,426 N.E.2d at 830. This expert, on cross-examination, was challenged to 
diagram the "precise chemical formula" which would resuIt in such an interaction. Admitting 
that no such precision was possible, the expert instead 
offered one scenario in which acidic chlorinated degreasers would interact with waste 
phenolic, releasing the phenolics so that the flash point would be achieved, thereby 
setting off the paint sludges which, in turn, would achieve the temperature sufficient 
for the ignition and combustion of liquid PCBs. All of these materials are deposited 
together in trench No.8. 
86 Ill.2d at 8, 426 N.E.2d at 830. 
341. 86 Ill.2d at 9, 426 N.E.2d at 831. 
342. 86 Ill.2d at 17, 426 N.E.2d at 837. New York seems also to follow this principle. See, 
Town of Preble v. Song Mountain, 308 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1970). 
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recently the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in the case of Wood v. 
Picillo,343 explicitly overruled the 1934 decision in Rose v. Socony-
Vacuum CO.344 In Wood v. Picillo, counts in public and private 
nuisance were brought against owners of a pig farm who also main-
tained a chemical dump on their property. 345 Although the Picillo 
dump seems to have been maintained much more casually than the 
one at issue in Wilsonville346 and was a smaller operation, it had 
other attributes in common with the Wilsonville landfill. The at-
tribute which was most damning, it seems, was the nature of the 
chemicals buried in and leaching from the site. Expert witnesses for 
the plaintiffs in the Picillo case testified that "monitoring wells, and 
adjacent waters revealed the presence of five chemicals: toluene, 
xylene, chloroform, III trichloroethane, and trichloroethylene."341 
One of plaintiffs' experts testified that the dump site was the "only 
possible source" of these pollutants.348 Plaintiffs' medical expert 
stated: 
Chloroform is a narcotic and an anesthetic that will induce 
vomiting, dizziness, and headaches in some persons eXposed to 
it. Trichloroethane and trichloroethylene, . . . are similar to 
chloroform in chemical structure and in toxic effect. Toluene 
and xylene are also toxins . . . that may cause irritation of the 
mucous membranes in the upper respiratory tract ... [and] 
also exert chronic or longterm effects on animals and 
humans. . .. [C]hloroform, trichloroethane, and trichloro-
ethylene are strong carcinogens that cause cirrhosis (cell death) 
of the liver and hepatoma (cancer of the liver) .... [T]here is 
no safe level of human or animal exposure to these chemicals. 
• • • • 
According to the experts, the chemicals present on defend-
ants' property and in the marsh, left unchecked, would eventual-
ly threaten wildlife and humans well downstream from the dump 
site.s49 
343. Wood v. Pici1lo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982). This case should gratify the author of a stu-
dent note critical of the ROBe decision, Note, 14 B.B. L. REv. 865, 867 (1934). 
344. Supra note 316. See also supra text and notes at notes 321-30. 
345. Wood v. Pici1lo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982). 
346. This Coventry, Rhode Island, landfill dump first called attention to itself in September 
of 1977, when it "erupted into fifty-foot flames" which firefighters "could not extin-
guish. . . ." Id. at 1245. 
347. Id. at 1246. 
348. Id. at 1247. 
349. Id. at 1246-47. 
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The court in Wood v. Picillo had already taken notice of the wet-
lands and fish-inhabited waters which lay downstream.85o Although 
the defendants in Wood v. Picillo insisted that the case was con-
trolled by the court's earlier decision in Rose v. Socony-Vacuum, the 
court disagreed, stating: 
Since this court decided Rose v. Socony-Vacuum in 1934, the 
science of groundwater hydrology as well as societal concern for 
environmental protection has developed dramatically. As a mat-
ter of scientific fact the courses of subterranean waters are no 
longer obscure and mysterious. The testimony of the scientific 
experts in this case clearly illustrates the accuracy with which 
scientists can determine the paths of groundwater flow. More-
over, decades of unrestricted emptying of industrial effluent in-
to the earth's atmosphere and waterways has rendered oceans, 
lakes and rivers unfit for swimming and fishing, rain acidic, and 
air unhealthy. Concerns for the preservation of an often precari-
ous ecological balance, impelled by the spectre of 'a silent 
spring,' has today reached a zenith of intense significance. Thus, 
the scientific and policy considerations that impelled the Rose 
result are no longer valid. We now hold that negligence is not a 
necessary element of a nuisance case involving contamination of 
public or private waters by pollutants percolating through the 
soil and traveling underground routes.861 
The trial court's order enjoining further chemical disposal at the site 
and ordering defendants to finance cleanup and removal of the toxic 
wastes was thus upheld. 
Illinois and Rhode Island seem to be the only jurisdictions so far to 
have produced appellate level decisions upholding the nuisance cause 
of action and its traditional remedies against hazardous waste dis-
posal sites. Nevertheless, no other jurisdiction has yet reached a con-
trary result on similar facts. 862 The question remains: what signifi-
cance does this have for Massachusetts and its hazardous waste dis-
posal sites? 
One consideration that seems important at the very outset is that 
these cases demonstrate the continued viability of the common law 
360. Id. at 1246. 
361. Id. at 1249. 
362. See Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARV. L. REv. 684 
(1981) (citing CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LmRARY OF CONGRESS, 96TH CONGo 2n 
SESS., SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA, 
CALIFORNIA, MICIDGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS (Comm. Print 1980». The note 
states that U[o)f the more than 60 private actions studied in that report, only one had come to 
judgment; other suits had been settled or were pending as of June 1980." Costs of Waste, 
supra note 362, at 684 n.7. 
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as a means of rectifying problems caused by hazardous waste dispos-
al.363 Some commentators have argued that the Resource Conserva-
tion and . Recovery Act (RCRA) preempts a common law theory of re-
covery against hazardous waste disposal sites.864 It has already been 
held that RCRA and other federal statutes do not preempt the appli-
cation of state and local anti-pollution statutes and regulations.366 At 
least one case, Nuclear Engineering Co. v. Scott,366 has specifically 
held, too, that RCRA does not preempt actions brought under the 
state common law of nuisance. That case arose as the result of a 
press conference at which former Illinois Attorney General William 
Scott announced his intention to bring suit against Nuclear 
Engineering Company (NEC) for violation of state environmental 
protection laws and for common law nuisance.367 NEC filed suit in 
the federal district court, alleging federal question jurisdiction. It 
charged that Scott's intention to close down NEC and seek an order 
that wastes stored at its site be removed violated NEC's fourteenth 
amendment rights and its rights under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act. The district court held that it did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the suit.868 This seems a sensible result, especial-
353. It may be necessary to stress here that this discussion is limited to the state, and not 
federal common law of nuisance, which was originally held to be applicable to interstate pollu-
tion actions brought by local government bodies. See City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid 
Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), eert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). Later, it was 
held to apply to action brought by the United States for purely intrastrate pollution. United 
States v. Solvents Recovery Service of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980). 
More recent cases, however, have greatly circumscribed this relatively recent and amorphous 
body of law specifically as it pertains to water pollution. See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. 
Nat'l Seaclammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
354. See, e.g., Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, supra note 352, at 
593 n.42. 
355. See supra note 177. 
356. Nuclear Engineering Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241,243 (7th Cir. 1981). Commentators 
have argued for the correctness of this view. See Note, Hazardous Wastes - Preserving the 
Nuisance Remedy, 33 STAN. L. REV. 675 (1981). 
357. Nuclear Engineering Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d at 243. 
358. As the court explained: 
Whether the Illinois action "arises under" federal law is a question that need not 
long detain us. Illinois' complaint on its face asserts only state law claims. NEC's 
argument in this regard is, briefly stated, that questions pertaining to provisions of 
the RCRA and other federal law are inextricably bound up with Illinois' claim and 
that Illinois has artfully pleaded its claim to avoid any references to federal law . Illi-
nois' claims, however, are predicated upon state law that at most incorporates federal 
law in certain tangential respects. See, e.g., TIl. Rev. Stat. ch. 111/2, SS 1003(g) and 
1012(f). Such state law incorporation of federal law does not fairly allow Illinois' state 
law claims to be construed as essentially federal in character. 
660 F.2d at 249. 
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ly in light of RCRA's savings clause, which expressly preserves all 
existing rights under statutory or common law. 869 
It is clear that RCRA does not per se preclude the availability of 
the common law nuisance action. Does that mean that the suit for 
abatement of a public nuisance is a potential device that Massachu-
setts municipalities could use in protecting themselves from the 
hazards of existing or proposed chemical disposal facilities? A closer 
look reveals that Massachusetts nuisance law inherently presents 
four elements which seriously impede such an endeavor. The first of 
these is the rule that only the Attorney General of the Common-
wealth may maintain an action to abate a public nuisance, in the 
absence of authorizing legislation.86o This doctrine was reiterated in 
a case in which the Mayor of Cambridge sought to restrain an 
upstream piggery from polluting the city's water supply.861 The 
three-page opinion in that case, however, predated the Home Rule 
Amendment by twenty-eight years. There is a good argument to be 
made that since the state legislature has the power to permit 
municipalities to bring their own suits for public nuisance that this is 
now one of the independent municipal powers which can be exercised 
under Home Rule even in the absence of enabling legislation. 862 
A second problem is that recent Massachusetts case law has held 
that liability in nuisance must be "based upon a determination that 
the interference is intentional and unreasonable or results from con-
duct which is negligent, reckless, or ultra-hazardous." 868 This re-
quirement would be no bar to the recovery of damages for an exist-
ing dump, since a strict liability theory could be resorted to for that 
problem,864 but such a standard increases the difficulty of proving 
that a situation exists which merits the granting of an order of in-
junction or abatement. Particularly if an existing or proposed facility 
359. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). It should be noted that this provision of 
RCRA is not imposed on the states. 40 C.F.R. § 123.7(a)(8) (1980). 
360. Att'y Gen. v. Boston & Albany R.R., 246 Mass. 292,140 N.E. 928 (1923). 
361. Mayor of Cambridge v. Dean, 300 Mass. 174, 175, 14 N.E.2d 163, 164 (1938). 
362. See supra text and notes at notes 160-72. It should be noted, too, that there is at least 
one existing statutory exception to the rule permitting only the Attorney General to bring 
public nuisance actions. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § lOA permits groups of at least ten 
state residents (the statute uses the word "persons," which includes businesses, organizations, 
and individuals) to bring suits to enjoin environmental damaged caused by violations of some 
environmental protection statute or regulation. This is discussed further infra text and notes 
at notes 406-08. 
363. Ted's Master Service, Inc. v. Farina Bros. Co., 343 Mass. 307, 178 N.E.2d 268 (1962). 
364. See supra note 345. 
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were in compliance with applicable state 861i and federal866 regula-
tions for hazardous waste disposal, it would be extremely difficult to 
prove that the operation was either negligent or ultra-hazardous. 867 
A third drawback to the utilization of a nuisance action is the reluc-
tance of Massachusetts courts to entertain nuisance actions against 
a prospective rather than existing nuisance. All of the Massachusetts 
nuisance cases involve existing nuisance situations.868 Dictum in one 
opinion suggests that the existence of sufficiently offensive condi-
tions at the time the suit is brought is one of the "vital issues in a bill 
to enjoin a nuisance."869 This latter statement was made, however, 
in the context of the more conventional hazards of a town dump. A 
court might be willing to adjust the requisite degree of likelihood of 
harm to the magnitude of the harm, should it occur, to account for 
the peculiar dangers of hazardous waste. The concurring opinion in 
Wilsonville stated that the court there would go so far as to enjoin 
the initial construction of a facility such as the one in that case, given 
the seriousness of the threat that it posed.870 
Another possible barrier to the bringing of a nuisance suit by a 
Massachusetts municipality against a HWF might be the Siting Act 
itself, with its provision for state licensure of HWFs. Can a state-
licensed facility constitute a nuisance?371 One case has held that 
when the Legislature directs or allows that to be done which 
would otherwise be a nuisance, it will be valid, upon the ground 
that the Legislature is ordinarily the proper judge of what the 
365. Massachusetts promulgated its new hazardous waste regulations on June 29, 1982. 
Boston Globe, June 30, 1982, at 17, 24. 
366. The federal regulations for hazardous waste disposal are still not forthcoming. On Nov. 
13, 1981, a federal district court ordered EPA to issue rules for the land disposal of hazardous 
waste. On March 15, 1982, however, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stayed that 
order, pending appeal, in light of EPA's "good faith efforts" to promulgate the rules. Illinois 
v. Gorsuch, No. 82-1035 (1st Cir. 1982). 
367. This issue is related to the question of whether a licensed land use can constitute a 
nuisance, discussed infra text and notes at notes 371-78. 
368. A Lexis search revealed none which were not. 
369. Lenari v. Kingston, 342 Mass. 705, 710 (1961). See also Turner v. Oxford, 338 Mass. 
286 (1959). At least one case declined to order an injunction against the building of stables in a 
residential area, taking the position that it was preferable to wait and see if nuisance condi-
tions would develop. Mullholland v. State Racing Commission, 295 Mass. 286, 3 N.E.2d 773 
(1936). 
370. Wilsonville, 86 n1.2d 1, 24, 426 N.E.2d 824, 845 (1981). There are jurisdictions which 
grant injunctions against purely prospective nuisances. See, e.g., Town of Preble v. Song 
Mountain, 308 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Powell v. Taylor, 263 S.W.2d 906 (Ark. 1954). 
371. Existing case law suggests that the license of a nuisance could be revoked. Revere v. 
Riceman, 280 Mass. 76, 181 N.E. 716 (1932). 
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public good requires, unless carried to such an extent that it can 
fairly be said to be an unwholesome and unreasonable law.s72 
While this principle may be thought to encompass the situation of a 
hazardous waste facility seeking to locate under the Siting Act, it 
probably does not create absolute immunity from nuisance suit for a 
HWF. It is instructive to consider the case in which this broad propo-
sition of law cited above issued-a private nuisance action by the 
operators of a drive-in movie theater to prevent the expansion of 
Logan Airport. S73 The Massachusetts SJC disposed of the plaintiffs' 
claim in a three-page opinion. By contrast, an action for public 
nuisance against a private developer brought by a municipality on a 
carefully developed factual record should stand in a much stronger 
and more respectable position before the court. It would at least 
merit the serious consideration that the Illinois Supreme Court gave 
the Village of Wilsonville in its suit. The defendant HWF in Village 
of Wilsonville had been licensed by the Illinois Environmental Pro-
tection Agency which also regulated the facility through the issuance 
of supplemental permits for each delivery of waste to the site.374 The 
defendant HWF argued that since the plaintiff village could appeal 
the Illinois EPA granting of permits, they had an adequate remedy 
at law. The HWF urged that this should preclude the granting of 
such equitable relief as injunction. 
The court in Village of Wilsonville rebuffed this argument, point-
ing out that "plaintiffs are not seeking a review of the issuance of 
permits but to enjoin a nuisance." 376 The court held that since it had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the abatement of public nuisances 
which may endanger the general welfare, the plaintiffs were proper-
ly before the court and entitled to whatever equitable relief the court 
found appropriate to award.376 This reasoning suggests that even 
where a state administrative framework exists, some courts will re-
main open to suits brought under common law pleadings.377 Even if 
Massachusetts courts prove so amenable, it is unclear whether they 
will require that potential plaintiffs first exhaust their administra-
372. Hub Theater, Ine. v. Mass. Port Auth., 370 Mass. 153,346 N.E.2d 371 (1976). 
373. 370 Mass. at 153, 346 N.E.2d at 371. 
374. Wilsonville, 86 ID.2d at 50,426 N.E.2d at 828. 
375. 86 ID.2d at 15, 426 N.E.2d at 837. 
376.Id. 
377. M. BROWN, supra note 11, at 238 (reporting that "Missouri ... residents successfully 
pursued a temporary restraining order to stop use of the state's first hazardous landfill just 
over a week after it was first approved by the state"). 
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tive remedies.378 The next section will present an overview of these 
possible administrative remedies. 
B. Administrative Remedies 
Humanity should be extremely conservative in its treatment of 
Earth's ecosystems. For every release of a toxic substance, 
every plowing under of a field, every filling of an estuary, every 
cutting down of a forest, every forcing to extinction of a popula-
tion or a species threatens the integrity of society's life-support 
systems. * 
The many layers of administrative decisionmaking involved in the 
siting process under the Siting Act379 provide opportunities for the 
introduction of the kind of evidence necessary for successful 
nuisance actions-evidence of significant prospective harm which 
could support a decision not to permit construction of a HWF on a 
particular site. The development of such evidence will be crucial to 
any municipality seeking to thwart a proposed HWF siting. The evi-
dence can and should be introduced at several stages of the proceed-
ings required by statute. 
The first mandatory determination prerequisite to a siting under 
the Act is the assignment of the proposed location as a HWF site. 
This is done either by the local board of health or by the State 
Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, in either case 
after a public hearing. The assignment of a site is subject to con-
straints that 
will insure that the facility imposes no significantly greater 
danger to the public health or . . . safety from fire, explosion, 
pollution, discharge of hazardous substances, or other . . . fac-
tors than the dangers that currently exist in the conduct and 
operation of other industrial and commercial enterprises in the 
commonwealth not engaged in the . . . disposal of hazardous 
waste, but utilizing processes that are comparable. S80 
Environmental lawyers and the expert witnesses they employ can 
have a field day with this standard. An argument can be made that it 
excludes, on its face, the construction of any landfill site, since no 
other "comparable process" is currently being used in the Common-
wealth. This statutory measure of risk purports to forbid the intro-
378. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, S 7 (West 1981). 
• Erlich, Environmental Disruption: Implications for the Social Sciences, Soc. SCI. Q. 
(March 1981). 
379. See supra text and notes at notes 102-36. 
380. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, S 150B (West 1981). 
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duction into the state of any enterprises more hazardous than those 
which already exist here "utilizing processes that are comparable." 
Scientific expert testimony could be marshaled to show that landfill 
disposal is sui generis, a unique hazard which the state should not 
suffer to license now simply because illegal dumping has been in-
flicted on it in the past. 
This is not to say that any hazardous waste facility could be or 
should be excluded under this standard. The recycling of waste oil or 
solvents, for instance, is not terribly different from the manufacture 
of these substances, enterprises which few are likely to argue should 
be excluded from the Commonwealth. By contrast, the landfill dis-
posal, or "dumping," of toxic chemicals is a different matter. One 
local scientist, who spent several years conducting research as an 
environmental chemist, reports that experts in this field actually 
consider landfill disposal of chemical waste to be "obsolete."381 In 
light of current knowledge it is "not clear that any [chemical] com-
pound is safe to dump."382 Even relatively degradable substances 
such as ammonia are dangerous in high concentrations, pose a threat 
to the water table, and readily enter the food chain in dangerous 
quantities. Many newer chemicals pose unknown and undefinable 
hazards since it "costs millions [of dollars] to study any compound 
for toxicity and 'environmental fate.' "383 Some substances become 
even more harmful when dumped in landfill. The pesticide DDT, for 
instance, breaks down in soil to an even more toxic chemical known 
as DDE.384 Some of the most dangerous chemicals to dump are 
PCBs, PBBs, and compounds such as pentachlorophenal (which are 
contaminated with dioxins, the offending ingredient of Agent 
Orange). One researcher has speculated that, of all the many types of 
waste, undifferentiated industrial waste is perhaps the "worst; made 
up of unknown compounds, and too contaminated to even study."386 
The best hope for safe disposal of such waste, he believes, is incinera-
tion. While the study of how chemical compounds break down under 
combustion is still relatively recent, it does seem that some sub-
stances can in this manner be reduced to more benign components. 
3~1. Interview with Bradford Gibson, Research Assistant, Dep't of Chemistry, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, in Cambridge, Massachusetts (June 21, 1982). Mr. Gibson was 
formerly an Environmental Chemist at Stanford Research Institute, Palo Alto, Calif. (now 
known as SRI International). 
382. [d. 
383. [d. 
384. [d. 
385. [d. 
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At the very least incineration reduces the volume of waste and 
changes uncontrollable water- and soil-borne pollution into more 
manageable airborne pollution. S86 
This is just an example of the sort of testimony which could be and 
should be brought to the siting process. The decisionmaking agency 
is required under the Siting Act to consider all evidence relevant to 
the issue of HWF safety brought before it by interested persons. 
"Any person aggrieved" by the action taken by the agency is given 
the right of appeal to the superior court. The court may set aside any 
agency action if it determines 
that the substantial rights of any party may have been violated 
because said decision violated constitutional provisions or was in 
excess of the statutory authority and jurisdiction of the board of 
health or was based on an error of law or was made upon unlaw-
ful procedure or was unsupported by substantial evidence, or 
was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.S87 
These determinations, as well as the findings required of the 
DEQE prior to granting the license for a HWF should provide signif-
icant safeguards for a municipality against the construction of a 
dangerous facility.s88 It should be noted, too, that in any adjudica-
386. [d. 
387. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, S 150B (West 1981). 
388. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, S 7 (West 1981) provides that the Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality Engineering: 
shall grant a license to construct, maintain and operate a facility on a site it deter-
mines that said construction, maintenance, and operation does not constitute a signif-
icant danger to public health, public safety, or the environment, does not seriously 
threaten injury to the inhabitants of the area or damage to their property, and does 
not result in the creation of noisome or unwholesome odors. In making this deter-
mination, the department shall consider, but not be limited to, the following informa-
tion which the applicant for a license shall submit in such form and manner as the 
department shall prescribe and require: detailed engineering plans and specifications; 
a description of maintenance and operating procedures; a description of the appli-
cant's qualifications and experience in constructing, managing, and operating a facil-
ity; a plan for closure and post closure care of the facility and site; a statement of the 
applicant's financial condition; a statement of the amount and types of waste to be re-
ceived at the facility; the results of chemical analysis of the surface and groundwaters 
in the area of the site's locus; and a hydrogeological study of the site area, for any pro-
posal to dispose of hazardous waste into or on the land, or for other proposals if the 
department has sufficient reason to believe that the potentialities exist for ground-
water contamination. The applicant shall be required to submit such other informa-
tion as the department finds to be relevant and useful in making its determination. 
The department shall, where appropriate in making its determination, further consid-
er such factors including, but not limited to, the following: topography, geological and 
soil conditions; climate; surface water and groundwater hydrology, including water 
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tory proceeding as defined by the State Administrative Procedure 
Act,889 any group of at least ten persons may intervene to help estab-
lish the issue of damage to the environment.89o Even where a specific 
siting assignment or licensing is not being challenged, the legality of 
the administrative practices and procedures of any municipal, coun-
ty, or state agency may be determined in a proceeding brought 
under the state's declaratory judgment act.891 
C. The Ultimate Municipal Self-Help: Borrowed Federal Supremacy 
Dayton, Ohio has adopted municipal ordinances prohibiting the 
storage of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs) within its city limits. The 
operators of a warehouse in that city which stored PCBs brought suit 
to challenge the ordinances in the federal district court. In SED, Inc. 
v. City of Dayton, 892 the corporation sought a declaratory judgment 
[d. 
run-off and run-on characteristics, wetlands and flooding conditions; drinking water 
supplies; and compliance with applicable statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions 
regarding the protection of air, water and land resources. 
389. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, S 1 (West 1981). 
390. [d. § lOA. 
391. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231A, SS 1-9 (West 1981). 
392. SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979, 981 (S.D. Ohio 1981). The degree of 
environmentally protective sentiment among some parts of that city's community might be 
gauged from the following cartoon which appeared in the Dayton Daily News, Nov. 8,1981, at 
B21. 
ThiS l~iS ~1and. h the Qff to Ule strip 
tnliS tand is land... Sha'e oil rigs... nililed nnmbains .. 
:\ 
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that the ordinances were "unconstitutional and invalid under the 
supremacy clause of the federal constitution . . . because the area 
of PCB storage regulation has been expressly pre-empted by federal 
law."393 It was uncontroverted that under the federal Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA) the Administrator of the United States 
EPA was directed to promulgate rules governing PCBs.394 The city 
of Dayton, relying on National League of Cities v. Usery,396 argued 
that federal preemption of traditionally local matters of safety, 
health, and land use would violate the principles of federalism 
espoused in that case.396 While the federal district court took a much 
more restrictive view of Usery doctrine than did the defendant city, 
it did agree that TSCA did not preempt the local ordinance. The 
court found that the ordinance came under one of the specific pre-
emption exemptions contained within TSCA itself: that a local regu-
lation is not preempted by TSCA where it is "adopted under the 
authority of the Clean Air Act or any other federal law."397 The 
court accepted and agreed with the city's contention that its ordi-
nance had been adopted under the authority of the Clean Water 
Act.39S 
The ultimate validity of the Dayton ordinance is still to be resolved; 
the opinion described above was only interlocutory.399 Nonetheless, 
there is good, if limited, authority for upholding certain municipal ac-
tions that are taken pursuant to federal statutory provisions. In City 
of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma,40o the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the right of a city which held a license issued to it under 
federal law to construct a power project in direct contravention of 
state law and in opposition to a referendum vote by the citizens of 
the state. The power project involved the construction of two dams 
393. SED, Inc., v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979, 981 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
394. 15 U.S.C.A. S 2605(e)(l) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
395. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See supra text and notes at notes 291-95. 
396. SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. at 983. 
397. SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. at 984 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B)(ii) 
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
398. 519 F. Supp. at 984. 
399. The decision at this stage of the proceedings overruled the plaintiffs' motion for partial 
summary judgment. It should be kept in mind that the ultimate significance of the case for the 
Massachusetts HWF situation is limited by the absence in the Ohio case of the state regulation 
issue. SED involves a problem of federal, not state, preemption, and the two have different 
contours. See, e.g., United States v. Town of Windsor, 496 F. Supp. 581 (D. Conn. 1981), which 
held that a federally subsidized experimental synthetic fuel manufacturing facility had to com-
ply with municipal permit and licensing requirements, despite a defense of preemption. 
400. 357 U.S. 320 (1958). 
786 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:715 
on the Cowlitz River, both of which were to be of a height in excess of 
that permitted by state statute and necessitated the taking by emi-
nent domain of state-owned land. 
The State of Washington challenged the authority of the Federal 
Power Commission to issue the license to the city, which allegedly 
"had not complied with applicable state laws nor obtained state per-
mits and approvals required by . . . statute." 401 The state charged 
that the city, "as a creature of the State ... cannot act in opposi-
tion to the policy of the State or in derogation of its laws." 402 The 
United States Supreme Court upheld the right of the city to act 
under its federal license and to exercise federal eminent domain 
power accordingly. The Court stated that it was "no longer open to 
question that the Federal Government under the Commerce Clause 
of the Constitution. . . has dominion, to the exclusion of the States, 
over navigable waters of the United StateS."40S 
Certainly, there will be very few cases in which the federal courts 
will uphold the right of a municipality to circumvent the laws of the 
state in which it is located, even where the municipality claims to act 
under authority of federal law. For courts to routinely uphold such 
actions would be in derogation of the prudential federalism prin-
ciples inherent in the abstention doctrine, and in the unwillingness of 
federal courts to hear constitutional claims against states by their 
own political subdivisions. A decision such as City of Tacoma would 
seem to vitiate the value of state autonomy within a federal system. 
Nevertheless, there is probably still a certain amount of space within 
the federal system for municipalities to successfully use federal stat-
utory authority to provide regulatory options other than those dic-
tated by the states. This should be especially true where municipali-
ties seek to prevent water pollution. The federal definition of navig-
able waters of the United States is extraordinarily broad, and in-
cludes not only interstate watercourses but also "all other waters 
such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams, . . . mudflats, sandflats, 
'wetlands' ... the degradation or destruction of which would ... 
or could affect interstate . . . commerce including any such waters 
. . . which are used or could be used for industrial purposes for in-
dustries in interstate commerce. . . ." 404 While this definition does 
not expressly include aquifers, it does cover virtually any remotely 
401. [d. at 328. 
402. [d. at 329. 
403. [d. at 334. 
404. 40 C.F.R. S 122.3(c)(3) (1980). 
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soggy place; it is tremendously broad in scope.405 According to the 
logic of the court in SED, Inc. v. Dayton, municipal ordinances or 
land use regulations adopted to further federal objectives in the 
Clean Water Act, for example, may withstand state challenge, there-
by preventing or modifying the development of a state-approved haz-
ardous waste facility otherwise inconsistent with such local regula-
tions. 
There is precedent, too, for municipalities suing a state under a 
federal water pollution statute. Several municipalities in Pennsyl-
vania brought suit against that state in federal court under the 
Water Pollution Control Act (currently the Clean Water Act), and 
were held to have standing to do SO.406 The dispute in that case was 
over disbursement of federal funds given to the state under the 
statute which were alleged to be owed to the municipalities, and not 
over a conflict of state and local regulations, but there seems to be no 
reason why such a suit could not be brought. It has been held, at 
least, that the eleventh amendment does not bar such a suit.407 
The construction and operation of a HWF in Massachusetts could 
quite conceivably involve a potential issue over the degradation of 
navigable waters of the United States. A newspaper story naming 
four Massachusetts towns being considered as HWF sites by the 
California based IT Corporation reported that "the company needs 
three million gallons of water a day to operate the proposed treat-
ment plant."408 Each of these proposed sites was located near a size-
able watercourse: two on the Taunton River, one on the Quaboag 
River, and one on the Merrimack.409 Another article in the press con-
cerning a siting proposal by Pennsylvania's Liqwacon Corporation 
to process inorganic liquid waste stated that this facility would need 
25,000 gallons of water daily.no This situation would seem to provide 
405. Recent case law upholds this expansive reading of the "navigable waters of the United 
States." In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Alexander, 17 ERC (BNA) 1376 (W.D. La. 1982) 
it was held that" 'wetlands' . . . includes land that supports vegetation tolerant to saturated 
soil conditions, whether or not inundation occurs regularly." Id. at 1377. 
406. Mun. Auth. v. Commw. of Pennsylvania, 496 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
407. Mun. Auth. v. Commw. of Pennsylvania, 496 F. Supp. at 687. See also Maine v. Thibou· 
tot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
The eleventh amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI, provides that the federal judicial power 
does not extent "to any suit ... prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of 
another State. . . ." It has also been construed to prohibit suits in federal courts against 
states by their own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
408. Blake, Four Mass. Sites Picked IYy Waste Disposal Firm, Boston Globe, Sept. 19, 1981, 
at 48. 
409. Id. 
410. Blake, Toxic Waste Facility Siting System Assailed, Boston Globe, Sept. 16, 1981, at 
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a proper context for local regulation of HWFs under a federal 
statute, to protect navigable waters. 
Massachusetts, of course, is in a position to obstruct municipal ef-
forts to self-regulate under borrowed federal authority. RCRA pro-
vides a procedure under which states may seek federal authorization 
for a state-developed hazardous waste program.411 A state with an 
approved program "is authorized to carry out such program in lieu 
of the Federal program." 412 Any action taken by a state under a haz-
ardous waste program authorized under RCRA has the same force 
and effect as an action taken at the federallevel,41s and is thus pre-
emptive of local regulations under the Supremacy Clause.414 Signifi-
cantly, at present, Massachusetts does not have final federal authori-
zation for its hazardous waste program. In this circumstance, there 
still seems to be room for discretion within the system allowing 
municipalities to create their own hazardous waste regulations. 
There are several possible sources of authority for such action. There 
is the exemption from federal regulation under TSCA, for instance, 
which was relied upon by the City of Dayton in the SED, Inc. case.415 
That provision exempts from federal preemption those rules which 
are adopted by states or their political subdivisions under the author-
ity of the Clean Air Act or any other federal law . 416 Another section 
48. 
411. Pub. L. 94-580, Sec. 3006(b) (1980). Massachusetts currently has "interim" authoriza-
tion under this provision. 
412. Pub. L. 94-580, Sec. 3006(b)(3) (1980). 
413. Pub. L. 94-580, Sec. 3006(d) (1980). A nice question arises as to whether a state hazard-
ous waste program authorized under RCRA might not be preempted (at least theoretically) by 
a local regulation made pursuant to a federal water pollution statute. The section of RCRA en-
titled "Application of Act and Integration With Other Acts" states that "[n]othing in this 
chapter shall be construed to apply to (or to authorize any State ... or local authority to 
regulate) any activity or substance which is subject to the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act and [other listed statutes]." 42 U.S.C.A. S 6905(a) (Supp. 
1980). If this provision is taken literally, then it would mean that a local regulation made pur-
suant to the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C: SS 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (an 
"activity . . . subject to" it) would rank higher in the federal statutory hierarchy than a state 
program authorized under RCRA, and would (theoretically) take precedence over such a pro-
gram. 
414. See supra text and note at note 143. 
415. See supra note 177; text and notes at 35-59. See also Nuclear Engineering Co. v. Scott, 
660 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1981), where the court noted: "NEC does not dispute that the RCRA 
does not preempt the body of state law upon which lllinois' claims are based insofar as they 
seek to impose upon the . . . facility standards more stringent than does the RCRA. See 42 
U.S.C. S 6929. See also Rettig v. Arlington Heights Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. 
Supp. 819, 823 (N.D. m. 1975)" 660 F.2d at 249 n.10. (citations by the court). 
416. 15 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
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of TSCA exempts from federal preemptive control state or local reg-
ulations which prohibit the use of a hazardous chemical substance or 
mixture within that state or locality. 417 RCRA itself explicitly pro-
vides that nothing in that Act "shall be construed to prohibit any 
state or political subdivision thereof from imposing any require-
ments, including those for site selection, which are more stringent" 
than those imposed by RCRA.418 
Although federal courts do not generally interfere in the division 
of power between states and municipalities, federal law does intro-
duce a wild card into a game which might otherwise be played with a 
deck stacked in favor of the states. At least some of the tenth amend-
ment power described in Usery is reserved not just to the states, but 
to "the people" generally.419 It has been suggested, too, that authori-
ty for action to preserve the environment may be found in the ninth 
amendment,420 which provides that the guaranteed rights of the 
federal Constitution "shall not be construed to disparage others re-
tained by the people."421 
Again, the hazardous waste problem is revealed to have yet 
another layer of dizzying legal complexity. It is difficult to appreciate 
what the significance of the concept of "borrowed" federal power 
might be. What does it mean for Massachusetts municipalities? At 
the very least, it should mean that the problem of siting hazardous 
waste facilities need not be one in which the state may simply assert 
its superior authority over subordinate municipalities. There are 
many federal rights, both constitutional and statutory, involved. The 
existence of these rights is the necessary predicate for federal court 
jurisdiction over hazardous wastes issues properly brought before 
those COurtS.422 This is important for Massachusetts municipalities 
because it means that serious hazardous waste issues need not be 
automatically decided against the municipality in the state courts on 
the single issue of legislative intent in adopting the Siting Act (if, 
417. [d. S 2617(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
418. 42 U.S.C. S 6929 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also supra text and notes at notes 
112-14. 
419. U.S. CONST., amend. IX. 
420. See C. HAAR, supra note 303, at 519 (citing Kutner,NeglectedNinthAmend:ment: The 
"Other" Rights Retained By the People, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 121 (1967); Note, 42 TEMP. L. Q. 46 
(1968). 
421. U.S. CONST., amend. IX. See Kutner, supra note 420, at 123-25. 
422. For a good example of federal jurisdiction improperly invoked, see the discussion of the 
Scott case supra text and notes at notes 356-59. 
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indeed, the state courts would deal with such problems so simplistic-
ally). 
Consider the following scenario as a sample illustration of this ad-
mittedly abstruse point: a Massachusetts municipality (call it 
"Townie") studies the hazardous waste problem, and pursuant to its 
various commissions of authority, passes a comprehensive set of haz-
ardous waste disposal regulations. Townie will do so pursuant to 
every source of power which may be available to it-its independent 
police powers;423 any applicable state enabling legislation such as the 
Wetlands Protection Act,424 for instance; federal authorization 
under the various pollution control statutes; and retained powers 
under the ninth and tenth amendments of the federal Constitution. 
Further, assume that Townie will explicitly invoke these sources of 
power in the preamble to these regulations. Townie's regulations will 
include prohibitions on the use or disposal of certain named sub-
stances, including PCBs, within Townie's limits, as well as a general 
ban on the landfill disposal of hazardous chemicals and strict air 
quality standards for chemical waste incinerators. 426 
A company that wishes to develop a hazardous waste disposal 
facility (call it "Dumper, Inc.") assigns Townie as a site under the 
Siting Act. Townie gives Dumper a copy of its regulations, explain-
ing that any facility would have to be in compliance with them. 
Dumper files suit in the county superior court, asking for a declara-
tory judgment that Townie's regulations are invalid under section 16 
of the Siting Act. Townie defends on grounds of its rulemaking dis-
cretion under the Clean Water Act, as authorized by TSCA.426 The 
declaratory judgment is issued nonetheless, and is upheld by the 
Massachusetts SJC. 
Townie may now appeal to the federal district court for review, 427 
since the highest court of the state has decided against the validity of 
its express rulemaking authority under the federal statute. The 
423. See supra text and notes at notes 168-69. 
424. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, S 40A (West 1981). 
425. The Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group is still skeptical about incineration. 
MASSPIRG Environmental Program Coordinator Raymond Dougan has said that "[t]he wide-
spread interest in burning of hazardous wastes as fuel poses an especially dangerous situa-
tion. . . . If properly incinerated, some of these wastes are rarely incinerated thoroughly, 
sending toxic and carcinogenic compounds up smokestacks. . . ." Masscitizen, supra note 4, 
at 8. MASSPIRG contends that all burning of hazardous waste should be prohibited, except 
when the resulting emissions are no worse than those from burning fossil fuels. Id. 
426. 15 U.S.C. SS 2617(a)(2)(b)(ii) & (iii) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
427. See 28 U.S.C. S 1257 (1978). 
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federal district court will now have a very important, and quintes-
sentially federal, task before it. It will have to clarify the limits of 
authority under hierarchical federal anti-pollution statuteS.428 It will 
also need to determine the relationship between the two major hazar-
dous substances regulatory statutes, TSCA and RCRA.429 It is not 
possible to predict, in the absence of the facts which would create the 
controversy, how Townie would fare in its efforts to prevent Dumper 
from operating a chemical waste landfill. The adoption of enlight-
ened federal regulations forbidding this activity could make the 
428. See supra note 413. RCRA's provision for integration with other federal acts, 42 
U.S.C. S 6905(a), subordinates its application in case of conflicts to the other named federal 
statutes, including the Water Pollution Control Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act. This 
seems to indicate the clear intention of Congress that the value of rational disposal of hazard-
ous waste should not be promoted at the cost of compromising the safety of the nation's water 
supply. 
429. TSCA and RCRA, both adopted in 1976, make absolutely no textual reference to each 
other. While reconciling these statutes is far beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted 
that this is an important task which will ultimately have to be undertaken if this country is go-
ing to have coherent environmental protection laws. 
The following diagram illustrates the coverage provided the various Federal legislative 
authorities affecting a chemical's life cycle. 
LEGISLATlVE AUTHORIllES AFFECTlNG mE UFE CYCLE OF A CHEMICAL 
~------ TSCA --.----- TSCA=-----:::'"'> 
-KEY-
CAA CLEAN AIR ACT 
CPSA CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT 
FFDCA FED. FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT 
FFA FLAMMABLE FABRICS ACT 
FHSA FED.HAZARDOUSSUBSTANCESACT 
FIFRA FED. INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE & 
RODENTICIDE ACT 
FWPCA FED. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
Source: EPA Journal, July/August 1979. 
HMTA HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPOR· 
TATION ACT 
OSHA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT 
PPPA POISON PREVENTION PACKAGING ACT 
RCRA RESOURCE CONSERVATION & 
RECOVERY ACT 
SDWA SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 
TSCA TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 
If the federal government wants to assert that the states have dispositive authority over 
hazardous waste under RCRA, then it must explain the relative rules of all other applicable 
federal statutes-at least four others, by this diagram. 
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whole problem moot.430 Indeed, since RCRA expressly provides that 
state and local hazardous waste disposal regulations must at a 
minimum meet the federal standards, courts will not be able to judge 
the adequacy of any regulations until federal standards are adopted. 
Further, with the increasing development of comprehensive federal 
schemes and the emphasis on cooperative federal-state pollution con-
trol efforts, it is unlikely that federal courts will interpret local regu-
lations so as to upset the predominantly federal and state sources of 
regulation. It makes basic sense, though, that a municipality which 
educates itself about environmental problems and adopts regulations 
rationally related to the achievement of intelligent environmental 
goals will be better able to protect its interests through state and 
federal regulatory programs than one which uses "crude 
measures,"4Sl such as restrictive zoning, or one which takes no ac-
tion at all. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although the Siting Act involves the disparate, perhaps even arbi-
trary treatment of Massachusetts municipalities, the Act does not 
appear to violate the provisions of the Home Rule Amendment. State 
courts consistently have upheld the plenary power of the state to im-
pose unequal burdens on its subdivisions through general laws. 
Neither the Home Rule Amendment nor the federal Constitution 
have been interpreted so as to require any form of "equal protection" 
for municipalities; for the courts to so decide would alter profoundly 
the structure of American governmental authority as well as elimi-
nate accepted economic differences among cities and towns. If HWF 
sitings are to be challenged successfully, it will not be through head-
on confrontation between local and state authorities. The outcome 
will turn on case-by-case evaluation, through administrative deter-
minations and tort law actions. In this scenario federal statutes 
should not be overlooked as possible sources of substantive municipal 
powers. 
Hazardous chemical wastes pose genuine dangers to the environ-
ment and to human health. Like ionizing radiation, many hazardous 
430. See supra, note 366 (federal regulations have not yet been promulgated). See also 
REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE COMPrROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNlTED STATES, EPA IS SLOW TO 
CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSlBILITY TO CONTROL HARMFUL CHEMICALS (CED-81-1, Oct. 28,1980); 
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNlTED STATES, HAzARoous WASTE FACILITIES WITH INTERIM 
STATUS MAy BE ENDANGERlNG PuBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (CED-81-158, Sept. 28, 
1981). 
431. See, e.g., Earth Management, Inc. v. Heard County, 248 Ga. 442 (1981). 
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chemicals are capable of damaging the DNA of human cells, causing 
mutations that can result in cancer or birth defects.482 Now that 
these effects are becoming more widely known, communities are 
rightly fearful of the substances that produce them. It is understand-
able that a municipality would want to keep such contaminants from 
reaching its soil and its water; but there is great irony in all this.488 
Hazardous wastes are not something imported from· outer space to 
bedevil an innocent populace. They are simply part of the substantial 
volume of garbage generated by a wealthy industrial society. They 
are as American as risk-taking and wastefulness generally. As long 
as Americans consume limitless quantities of hair dryers and cas-
sette players, gasoline and soda pop, tires and batteries, no-iron fab-
rics and disposable plastic containers, Americans will produce cor-
responding quantities of hazardous chemical waste. 
For decades, the consuming public has contributed to the hazard-
ous waste problem in almost total ignorance of its vicious cycles of 
byproducts-waste from the process of manufacturing goods, waste 
of the goods themselves, and mounting garbage, some of it insidious-
ly dangerous. More careful choice of resource commitments will 
diminish the amount of waste; but an industrial society will inevit-
ably produce some hazardous wastes. Even with perfect knowledge 
of the environmental consequences of consumption habits, it would 
be difficult to change them; it might not be desirable ultimately. 
Citizens of municipalities seeking to protect themselves from haz-
ardous waste problems must realize that the price of really Usolving" 
the problem will be fewer goods at higher prices. Locating a waste 
dump in the next town, or the one down the river or in the next 
state, is not a "solution." All the waters on the planet are ultimately 
connected in the same cycles. All chemical contamination eventually 
reaches and accumulates in the food chain.484 With this in mind, the 
432. L. CASSARET & J. DoULL, supra note 55, at 454·56. 
433. Consider the situation created by the Woburn dump: 
In the northeastern corner of Woburn sits Industriplex, an industrial development 
covering roughly 300 acres. For 150 years industries have used and dumped chemi-
cals there. These chemicals wastes are potentially hazardous for people working on or 
living near the site. 
Industriplex is south of Wilmington, north of route 128 and west of route 93, which 
separates it from Reading, so that Wilmington and Reading are potentially affected 
as well as Woburn. Most of the land is, or was at one time, wetlands and the head-
waters of the Aberjona River. The Aberjona runs into the Mystic, and if these 
materials enter the river water, every town along both rivers could be affected. 
Woburn Odor Project, Dep't of Urban and Environmental Policy, Tufts University, Medford, 
MA 02155 (undated flyer). 
434. Consider the following media coverage of one study. 
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hazardous waste facility siting problem looks.less like a contest that 
can be "won" by the side with the cleverest lawyers. Excluding a 
chemical dump from particular municipal limits will not keep chem-
icals themselves from leaching into the water supply. Percolating 
underground waters, for instance, do not honor municipal bounda-
ries. Massachusetts municipalities which are now "safe" from HWF 
development because they have no industrial zoning have not 
escaped the hazardous waste problem. The city or town that takes 
action to prevent a facility from locating there may be perfectly justi-
fied in feeling that it would be unfair to take on the burden of chem-
ical waste disposal for the entire state; but it is no more "fair" to im-
pose this hazard on any other town, nor is it "fair" that Massachu-
setts' PCBs should all be shipped to Alabama for disposal, as they 
are now.436 
Perhaps the fundamental factor underlying the state versus local 
conflict is our scientific and technical inability to deal with hazardous 
wastes in a manner which is uniformly safe and responsible. Chem-
ical wastes must go somewhere. They can be stored, buried, re-
cycled, or burned. No single treatment method is decidedly best for 
all wastes in all situations. Currently, there are relatively safe 
methods of hazardous waste disposal-methods that are no more 
dangerous than the industrial process that produced the chemicals in 
the first instance. These methods are much more expensive than 
landfill dumping and have not yet been widely implemented.436 
A new study confirms that about 97 percent of Michigan's 9.2 million residents are 
still contaminated by polybrorninated biphenyls almost a decade after the chemical 
entered the state's food chain. The finding published today in the Journal of the 
American Medical Assn., follows other studies showing that the human body is almost 
incapable of excreting the chemical and that highly exposed individuals continue to 
suffer medical problems. The PBB contamination began in 1973, when several thou-
sand pounds of PBB, a synthetic chemical used to render products such as television 
and radio casings fire resistant, was accidentally mixed into dairy cattle feed. 
Boston Globe, April 16, 1982, at 6. 
435. Past problems vividly illustrate that the refusal of various authorities to participate ac-
tively in the responsible disposal of wastes eventually affects us all. There is no way for a com-
munity to insulate itself by abdicating responsibility. For example, at the end of the Vietnam 
War, the U.S. Government found itself with a large quantity of surplus Agent Orange to 
dispose of. This justly infamous herbicide is contaminated, as an inevitable consequence of the 
manufacturing process, with a substance known as 2, 3, 7, 8 tetrachlorodibenzo-p dioxin, or 
simply "dioxin." Along with plutonium, dioxin is one of the two most toxic substances known 
to man. T. WHITESIDE, THE PENDULUM AND THE TOXIC CLOUD: THE COURSE OF DIOXIN CONTAMI-
NATION 2-3 (1978). The federal government approached several states with proposals to make a 
final resting place for the left-over Agent Orange. None would have it. The load of remaining 
barrels was finally buried at sea, leaving a legacy of poisonous wastes which will accumulate 
and may pollute our ocean resources. 
436. New York Times, March 13,1983, sec. 3 at 1,17. 
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Unfortunately, landfill dumping of hazardous chemicals remains the 
predominant method of disposal. Many scientists feel that landfill 
dumping is obsolete, unreasonably dangerous, and an unacceptable 
disposal method. Certainly, the recent hazardous waste incidents, in-
cluding hauling spillages, landfill leaching problems, and ground 
water pollution, have been sufficient to raise grave doubts about our 
ability to control volatile hazardous wastes through conventional 
waste disposal practices. The idea that there is "failsafe" landfill 
technology to prevent leakage, explosion, or container decay is fast 
becoming discredited.437 In this light, local opposition to the pro-
posed siting of a hazardous waste facility does not seem merely 
parochial localism; rather, it may well be premised on legitimate and 
universal concerns for safety and health. 
illtimately, the testing ground for the problem of hazardous waste 
disposal should not be obscured by a contest between local and state 
authority. Nevertheless, municipalities are properly concerned about 
the dangers of hazardous waste sites and the ability to protect and 
develop their communities as they see fit. While they remain largely 
untested, the administrative procedures of the Siting Act appear to 
provide the opportunity for municipalities to participate in the siting 
process so as to foster and protect local concerns. Municipalities 
must actively and vigorously participate in the siting process, possi-
bly seeking reform where administrative procedures prove inade-
quate to respect legitimate community concerns. It is in this spirit of 
constructive cooperation that the problem of hazardous waste dis-
posal and treatment must be addressed by all parties concerned. 
437. See M. BROWN, supra note 11 (discussing the analogous problems of nuclear waste dis-
posal); Shapiro, Nuclear Waste, The New Yorker, Oct. 19, 1981, at 53-139. 
